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-CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
" ... , the newly liberalized food marketing systems created new challenges and
risks for governments. In each country, major concerns arose over how to contain
food price instability and source adequate supplies of maize grain during local
production shortfalls." (Jayne et aI. 1999, p.6).
1.1 Background
Until recently, Mozambique and most countries in the Southern Africa (SA) region had
centrally planned and controlled economies. The control of the agricultural food sector
was pursued by creating large state farms and marketing boards that were granted a
monopoly on maize trade, establishing a system of fixed prices over space and time (a
policy of pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing), and subsidizing consumers.
With varying motivations, scope and speed, most countries in the SA region (see figure
1.1) embraced structural adjustment programs (SAPs) starting from the early 1980s
(World Bank; Jayne et a1.; Kahkonen and Leathers). In general, the SAP included a
gradual privatization of state enterprises, currency devaluation, agricultural food price
liberalization and removal of other tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. In addition,
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countries in the SA region engaged in regional and multilateral trade agreements, and
fonned trade blocks to facilitate trade among members and discriminate against outsiders.
White maize is the most important food staple in Mozambique and in the SA region. It is
both the main source of calories and the largest produced crop (Van Rooyen and
Sigwele). However, as reforms influenced sectoral and regional growth patterns, shifted
relative prices of goods, and reshaped economic and social institutions, new concerns
about maize production, consumption, and trade emerged. Indeed, the effect of food
market refonns on the vast majority of the population oftbe SA region, which is mainly
rural and believed to live in poverty and food insecurity (Van Rooyen and Sigwele),
remains controversial. While the implementation of SAPs has stalled in some countries of
the SA region (e.g. Zimbabwe), the reforms have continued for the last 15 years without
significant reversals in Mozambique.
Figure 1.1. Map of the Southern Africa Region
SWAZILAND
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1.2 Research Problem
More than ten years have passed since Mozambique and most countries of the SA region
reformed their food-crop market and made trade agreements to promote market-based
economies, yet price instabilities and maize shortages are still puzzling local populations
and governments (Jayne et al.). Inefficiency in spatial arbitrage is a possible explanation
of why food shortages continue to be a problem in spite of the market reforms in
Mozambique. When spatial trade is efficient, food shortages in deficit regions are
transmitted to surplus regions via prices, and arbitrage triggers flows of food across
space. Consumers from deficit regions pay lower food prices and producers from surplus
regions receive higher prices and, therefore, have an incentive to increase production.
Through efficient spatial arbitrage, the risk of crop failure in some regions is shared over
a large market area, prices are more stable, and food shortages may be prevented. It is,
therefore, difficult to overemphasize the need for spatial trade between spatially dispersed
maize markets.
Getting the prices right through market liberalization policies such as ending the system
of fixed prices, and subsidies to state-owned companies may not be suflicient to trigger
spatial arbitrage ifmarket infrastructure (roads, storage facilities), and institutional
arrangements (financial institutions, market information, trading norms, dispute
settlement mechanisms) are inadequate. Poor road infrastructure may impose high
transportation costs and limit both the diffusion of price information and the market area.
Market institutions influence asset ownership (physical, financial) and business practices
such as reliance on middlemen and investment and specialization in agricultural trade.
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Empirical evidence suggests that many countries implementing market reforms have
failed to grow partly due to undeveloped public infrastructure such as roads (World
Bank).
In the transition to a market-based economy when marketing boards and state companies
are dismantled, the questions are how did maize markets respond? How integrated are
spatially dispersed maize markets? Are they functioning well enough to drive maize from
surplus regions to deficit ones? Is the road network adequate? The assessment of spatial
market integration and price dynamics is the starting point to measure the performance of
the food market in the post-reform period. Knowledge of how shocks in one regional
maize market are transmitted to other markets is an empirical question, and has
implications for economic policy (e.g. mitigation of food shortages; food security).
1.3 Research Objectives
The general objective of this research is to assess spatial maize trade and price dynamics
during the post-reform period in Mozambique. More specifically this study aims to:
l) Estimate the efficiency of spatial maize price arbitrage after maize price
liberalization in Mozambique;
2) Determine lead-lag relationships among interregional maize prices in
Mozambique.
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1.4 Contribution to Literature and Summary of Procedures
The literature on market integration is vast, and the techniques used to assess spatial
arbitrage are increasingly sophisticated. However, studies on spatial trade in the SA
region are very few. The SA region is an unusual region because: a) the food market
reforms have been carried out simultaneously in most countries in the region, b) the food
market reforms have been implemented in a hostile environment (regional wars and
climate shocks), c) the vast majority of the population is poor (Van Rooyen and Sigwele),
d) the phasing ofreforms have generated some controversy, e) some countries have been
experiencing policy reversals (Jayne et al.), and f) the data quality tends to be poor (here
many observations that are missing). For example, the food reforms in Mozambique were
initiated while the country was in its third successive war and had millions of displaced
(poor) people. Yet, attempts to assess trade links between spatial maize markets in
Mozambique are very few. Using price correlations, Tschirley and Santos, and Zavala
found evidence that maize markets are becoming integrated in Mozambique. However,
these studies rely on price correlations that often lead to erroneous conclusions (Harris;
Baulch; Li and Barrett).
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it uses more data (eight years of
weekly and monthly maize price data) and covers a larger geographical area (entire
Mozambique) than past studies. Second, unlike previous studies, this work combines two
approaches: the Baulch's parity bound model (PBM) is used to directly measure the
efficiency of spatial arbitrage, and time-series procedures are used to model price
dynamics. The PBM is a switching regression that accounts for nonstationary transfer
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costs and trade discontinuities that often cause bias and inconsistency of parameter
estimates from models that use only prices to make inferences about market integration
(Barrett). In this study, time-series procedures are used to capture price dynamics, and
measure causal flows between spatial maize prices, not as a test of market integration.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
This paper is organized in six chapters. Chapter II provides further background about
Mozambique. It provides the history ofMozambique's economic reforms since 1975,
including a description of the maize marketing sector. Chapter III presents the theoretical
framework relevant to analyzing maize markets in Mozambique. The data, data sources
and the modeling procedures are detailed in chapter IV. This chapter describes the data
used to accomplish the study objectives, and builds up the switching regression model
used to test for arbitrage efficiency, and the time series models used to analyze price
dynamics. The results are presented, and discussed in chapter V. The interpretation of
empirical results provides an understanding of the extent to which markets are integrated
in Mozambique, and the lead-lag relationships between spatial maize markets. Finally,
chapter six summarizes the results of the research, discusses study limitations, and makes
suggestions for future research in light of lessons learned.
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LCHAPTER II
THE MAIZE MARKETING CHANNEL IN MOZAMBIQUE
2.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the organization of the maize marketing channel and gives some
historical background of the market environment and food market transformations in the
past decade in Mozambique. The discussion includes trader's access to transportation
infrastructure, information, and credit. Harris, and Benson and Faminow argue that
empirical models should be derived from the general economic theory by choosing
appropriate constraints or asswnptions that reflect the market structure and organization.
Further, an understanding of the data generating process allows correct interpretation of
the results (Harris).
The plan of the chapter is as follows. First, a general background about the market
environment in Mozambique in the past two decades is briefly provided in section 2.2.
The regulation and the deregulation of the Maize sector are discussed in section 2.3 and
2.4 respectively. Next, maize market information and the transportation infrastructure are
described in section 2.5. A description of the maize marketing channel and its
participants is provided in section 2.6. Section 2.7 discusses storage and credit
arrangements, and section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 General Background About Mozambique
Mozambique is located in the Southern African (SA) region, and has approximately 17
million inhabitants over an area of799,380 square kilometers. Agriculture is the main
economic sector in Mozambique. It makes up 30% ofGDP, employs over 80% of the
active population (PARPA; DPDS-UEM-IFPRI), and provides more than 80% of foreign
exchange earnings (Jeje et al.). Maize is the main staple food. It is both the largest
produced and consumed crop (DPDS-UEM-IFPRI).
After 500 years of colonization, Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal in
1975. Since then, Mozambique faced military incursions of the (then) Rhodesia (1976 to
1979), floods (1977 and 1978), border closure and continuous layoff of Mozambican
miners working in South Africa, internal civiI war fueled by cold war interests (1981-
1991), and droughts (1982). These events led the Mozambique into a deep recession that
brought much of the population near starvation (World Bank; Landau). The wars
destroyed almost all infrastructure and displaced millions of people. The country was
considered the poorest in the world in the early 1990's (Landau; World Bank). By 1992
the civil war was over, and in 1994 Mozambique successfully held its first national
democratic elections.
Economic development during the colonial period was very modest (Mucavele). The
(few) investments made by the colonizers were channeled to plantations intended to
supply Portugal with raw materials such as sugar cane, tea, cotton and cashew (Jeje et
aLl. After independence in 1975, the new Government of Mozambique (GoM) continued
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-operating a command economy, adopted Marxist-Leninist policy, and attempted to
collectivize agriculture (WhiJte). The procurement, distribution, and processing of food
was exclusively undertaken by heavily subsidized government-owned companies. These
policies, combined with the effect of the wars, droughts, and weakening support from the
Soviet Union, resulted in budget deficits and food shortages.
The policy change in Mozambique began in 1983 (see table 1) when the ruling party,
FRELIMO, acknowledged that it had made a mistake in emphasizing state fanus rather
than the "family sector". The GoM began to reduce some controls and offer more
opportunities to the private sector (White).
In September 1984, Mozambique joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
World Bank (WB), and in July 1987 launched the Economic Rehabilitation Program
(ERP), a structural adjustment package supported by the IMF and the WB. The objective
of ERP was, among others, to end budget deficits and stabilize the economy through
currency devaluation and reduced public expenditures (World Bank). The economic
policy also included rehabilitation and privatization of state enterprises, trade
liberalization, and some deregulation of prices and interest rates (see table I, p.7). The
ERP was implemented in a hostile environment as droughts and the escalating civil war
continued to ruin the economy. In 1990, the Economic and Social Rehabilitation Program
(ESRP) succeeded the ERP, providing the basic framework for current economic and
social policy.
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Table 2.1. Policy Changes in Mozambique, 1975-2000.
1975-83: Building a 1987-present: More intensive refonn
centrally-planned economy 1983-86: Partial liberalization
Fiscal policy and public Party and state merged, Fiscal restraint with prioritization of
1987: income tax reform; 1997 onwards: reform of the
expansionary fiscal policy partly completing ongoing projects and budget system; 1998: tax reforms; public sector salary
sector reform due to war. rehabilitation. decompression; 1999: VAT introduced; new civil service
salary structure.
State owned enterprises / Nationalization of social Some encouragement to private 1987: privatization begun with 30 small enterprises; 1989:
private sector activities (e.g. rented housing activity, but no reform of state owned law for privatization; by 1998 over 900 enterprises
development and funeral services). enterprises. privatized; 1999: completion of privatization of small and
medium-sized enterprises (by mid-99 1,200 privatizations).
1987: increase in interest rates; separation of Bank of
Monetary and financial 1980: new currency (metical) Directed credit at subsidized rates Mozambique (BoM) into BoM and Commercial Bank of
1P0licy introduced. continued. Mozambique (BCM); 1996: privatization of BCM, interest
rates liberalized; 1999 end of credit ceilings; BoM
authorized to issue T-Bills for monetary control purposes.
1987: many subsidies eliminated; minimum prices replace
IPrice controls extended over a
Controls on fruits and some vegetables fixed prices for several crops (1989), extended to maize and
Price policy
and meats removed, and price of staples rice (1990), beer and tobacco (1991), and consumer prices
large range of commodities. rose by up to four times the original of rice, sugar and milk (1992 also beefproducer price feU);
level. all other prices except those produced under monopolistic
conditions (1993).
1987: 400 % devaluation (January) and subsequent further
Fixed exchange rate (and Export retention scheme introduced (on devaluations; 1989: The Sistema nao-Administrativo de
Exchange rate Policy licenses! quotas on external Alocacao de Divisas established; 1990: secondary market
trade). case- by-case basis). established; 1992: official rate linked to secondary market,
leading to unification of official and secondary markets.
Authorization of some agricultural 1989: start of tariff reform and strengthening of customs;
State monopolies of external
enterprises to engage in external trade. 1991: six tariff rates, maximum 35%; 1996: import tariffs
Reduction in number of commodities
Policy Trade Itrade and domestic wholesale covered by monopoly trading company
simplified, with 18% average tariff; 1997: customs
~ctivities. management privatized; 1999: maximum tariff reduced toand/or with centrally administered 30"10.
inter- regional trade.
Source: Adapted from White (1999)
r.......
Table 2.1. Policy Changes in Mozambique, 1975-2000 (Continued)
1975-83: Building a centrally-planned 1987-present: More intensive reform
economy 1983-86: Partial liberalization
Large project approach, state fanns and
Agricultural
communal villages. State fanns received most
Price decontrol for selected commodities and
1987: break up oflargest state fanns; 1995:
government support, so communalization limited, cashew liberalization; 1997: land Law; 1999:
policy and 90 per cent rural population on individual trade permitted (see other categories in table). begin implementation of Agricultural Program
fanns outside this system. (PROAGRI).
Attempts to protect social spending from early
90s and to increase quality from mid-90s. 1995:
Social sectors Expansion of social services. Destruction of social infrastructure during war. adoption of Health Sector Recovery Program.1999: Poverty Action Plan adopted by Council
of Ministers; adoption Education Sector
Foreign
Strategic Program.
Little foreign investment from Western countries. Foreign investment code. Further encouragement, including sale of landinvestment to foreigners.
Labor Controlled labor market in state/modem sector. New labor law gives managers greater Rise of trade union movement, but real
markets autonomy in hiring, firing and pay. minimum wage falls.
1977: Marxist-Leninism adopted as official 1990: new constitution; 1992: peace accord;
Politics! ideology, FRELIMO remodels itself as a 1983: 4th FRELIMO party congress marks shift
1994: multi-party elections (October); 1999:
Governance vanguard party; 1982: FRELIMO reverts to in policy; 1984: Nkomati Accord (March). elections; one of II countries to draft and the
populism to rebuild party.
25 Principles to Combat Corruption in African
Countries.
Reliance on Soviet aid, some support from
I987:first IMF loan; Paris and London Club
1984: joined IMFlWorld Bank (!Fls); USAID rescheduling; 1992: end of Soviet aid;
Aid Progressive Development Assistance Committee starts aid; 1986: start policy discussions with 1995:bilatcral donors publicly disagree with
(DAC) donors. !Fls. I?viF; 1999: HIPIC (Highly Indebted Poor
Country) completion point.
Source: Adapted from White (1999)
..............--'::"' _ _ ~ .~ ~.lQn J{JfS.I.
-Since 1996, albeit from a tiny base, Mozambique has been experiencing remarkable
economic growth reflecting the expansion in agriculture and exports, and inflow of new
investments (World Bank). Such economic growth has come with single digiti inflation,
stable foreign exchange rate, and a 7-10 % GOP growth rate2 (pARPA; UNDP). Despite
the reported economic progress, over two thirds ofMozambicans, living predominantly
in rural areas, fall below the poverty line and are believed to live in absolute poverty
(OPDS-UEM-IFPRl; PARPA). Foreign debt has doubled from 1986 to 1997, and the
country still depends on foreign aid to balance the budget (World Bank).
2.3 The Regularization of the Maize Market
State intervention in the Mozambican maize sector dates from colonial times, and was
continued in post-independence Mozambique. Like many other countries of the SA
region, maize was the foundation of an implicit "social contract" that the new GoM made
with the people to restore smallholder agriculture that was abandoned during the colonial
period (Jayne et a1.). Yet, government intervention did not emphasize smallholder
agriculture. Rather, the GoM adopted a system of fixed prices over time and space, and
created large state farms and geographic maize monopolies.
In 1981, with support of Nordic aid, the GoM founded its main grain marketing company
AGRlCOM. AGRlCOM had a mandate to guarantee disbursement of maize to consumers
and inputs to producers of all regions of the country while "protecting" maize producers
from losses via pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing. The fixed-price system also
1 The inflation rate was between 30 - 70% since 1986 (WB). According to the GoM, the inflation grew to
13% in 1999/2000 mainly due to floods.
2 The GOP growth of only 2.1 % in 2000 is due to floods (IMF).
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aimed to control the margins earned by private traders whose selection was under tight
regulatory scrutiny. The approval and licensing of private traders was directly controlled
by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Coulter; Macamo).
Notably important during the civil war period (1982-1992) that ruined physical
infrastructure and the economy as a whole, AGRICOM accumulated debts that could no
longer be covered by either the Nordic aid or the GoM (Coulter; Macamo). In 1994, and
under the ERP-ESRP, AGRICOM was restructured and renamed the lnstituto de Cereais
de Mocambique (lCM), a grain-marketing para-statal with a similar mandate.
2.4 The Deregulation of the Maize Market
By the mid 1980's the GoM realized that the planned economy had failed. Mozambique
was facing severe budget deficits and was not able to feed its people. The ongoing civil
war eroded the infrastructure, disrupted production, trade, social services, and displaced
millions of people (World Bank). These compound problems led the GoM to adopt the
donor-supported structural adjustment program (SAP).
One of the ERP-ESRP policies was gradual elimination of subsidies on state enterprises
followed by privatization. The rCM was created under this policy. It inherited part of
AGRICOM's personnel and all physical assets, which included 120 storage facilities and
235,0003 metric tons of usable storage (Coulter). However, AGRICOM's liabilities were
passed to the GoM. The mandate ofICM was thought to be a modest one. It included the
supply of inputs to producers, statistical data gathering, and diffusion of storage
3 Jayne et al. estimate AGRlCOM's storage capacity at 160,000 metric tons.
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-techniques (Coulter). The rCM main task., however, was to act as the maize buyer of last
resort at pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices. By the time rCM was created,
Mozambique was pursuing a tight monetary and fiscal policy that included eliminating
subsidies to state enterprises and a market-based money-lending policy. Paradoxically,
this meant that rCM had to generate funds to cover its own operations, yet always
observing fixed prices set by the GoM.
The privatization of the banking system in 1996 compounded the liquidity problems
faced by rCM, since it meant that rCM had to operate at the (then) commercial interest
rate of 43 % (Coulter). The inability of rCM to carry out its mandate allowed the
development of a strong infonnal sector (Macamo). Further measures of ERP-ESRP led
to replacing the system of fixed prices with maize "reference" prices in 1990 (White),
followed by liberalization of maize pricing in 1996/7.
2.5 Description of the Maize Marketing Channel
This section describes the maize marketing channels in Mozambique. As such, the
characteristics and functions of market participants are provided. The structure of the
maize market reflects demand and supply conditions (including legal constraints) that
determine the pricing behavior. Hence, an understanding of the maize market structure is
essential for modeling spatial maize trade and price dynamics, which is the objective of
this study.
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Both fonnal and informal traders participate in maize marketing in Mozambique. Formal
traders are those who hold a trading license. To be eligible, candidates must submit
several certificates (a certificate of literacy, clean criminal record, commercial and
property registry, and of paying taxes), and a declaration that they are not public servants.
In addition, import private traders must hold an import license, a certificate of
commercial registry, certification of paying taxes, and a certification from custom duties.
Formal traders are subject to inspections involving the Ministries of Commerce, Health
and Labor and State Administration.
Becoming a formal trader requires money, massive paper work, and much time. The costs
of becoming a formal trader are believed to have triggered the emergence of infonnal
trading (Coulter; Macamo; MOAlMSU). Traders are considered informal if they market
maize without a legal license. Informal traders are not officially recognized and do not
pay taxes. However, they pay a symbolic stall fee to municipal authorities (MOA/MSU).
Formal traders (who pay taxes) have pressured the GoM to ban informal trading. The
Government's responses to informal trading have been inconsistent: tolerance from the
Ministry of Commerce, and hostility by health and customs authorities (Macamo).
The main participants in the maize markets, their links, and market's pricing points are
summarized in figure 2.1. Thicker lines indicate the most important maize flow in the
marketing channel. As figure 2.1 indicates, northern Mozambique relies solely on maize
produced within the region while southern Mozambique imports maize from central
Mozambique and from South Africa. Generally, maize is paid upon delivery using cash.
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-Figure 2.1.a. The Maize Marketing Channel in Northern Mozambique.
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2.5.1 Maize Producers and Technologies
Source: Adapted from Arlinda (2001)
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varies across the country. Southern Mozambique has sandy soils and erratic rainfall and,
maize production in Mozambique. With few exceptions, maize production is rainfed and
south has historically been a maize deficit region (Jayne et a1.; Tschirley and Santos).
therefore, is less suitable for maize production than the central and northern regions. The
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Agroecological conditions and technology determine, in large extent, the potential for
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-Figure 2.t.b. The Maize Marketing Channel in Central/Southern Mozambique
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Depending upon rainfall fluctuations, central Mozambique may experience either maize
deficits or surpluses. Northern Mozambique is a maize surplus region even during
regional droughts (Jayne et al.; Tschirley and Santos). Despite the fact that the south is a
deficit region in all years, and northern Mozambique has a favorable agroecological
conditions for intensive agriculture (Jeje et al.), interregional maize shipments records
show that grain is not being shipped from northern to southern Mozambique. Maize
exports from Northern Mozambique to neighboring countries (Jayne at al.; Tschirley)
occurred when neighboring countries experienced bad harvests (1997 and 1998). Maize
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-prices remain very low in northern Mozambique, and subsistence agriculture is a
common practice (Jeje et al.).
Maize producers are usually classified based on the size of land they work. Producers
having less than 5 acres compose the "family sector". Large producers, locally known as
the "private sector", are those who fann at least 50 acres and have a truck or a tractor or
both. Approximately 80% of the maize sold in the market is produced by the family
sector (Coulter). However, smallholder agriculture is labor intensive with low usage of
capital. Smallholders rely on hand hoes and, when available, some animal traction,
especially in southern Mozambique. The usage of agrochemicals and mechanized
agricultural equipment (such as tractors) is limited to a small number of large private
companies and joint ventures concentrated mainly in northern Mozambique. The average
smallholder's maize yield ranges from 0.3 to 1.3 tonlha across provinces (Jeje et al.). As
figure 2.1 indicates, smallholders in southern Mozambique sell part of their maize
production to small-scale assemblers/wholesalers while those in northern Mozambique
sell maize to large-scale wholesalers as well.
2.5.2 Maize Wholesalers
Most domestic maize that is not consumed on-farm is from maize surplus provinces of
Cabo-Delgado and Nampula in the north, and from Zambezia and Manica in central
Mozambique (Coulter). Despite that, only 25 % of a total of2,724 operational wholesaler
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shops are located in north and central Mozambique. The south has 75 % of the wholesaler
Usually, wholesalers are formal agents that have considerable experience, some access to
credit either from commercial banks or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and
trade other goods in addition to agricultural commodities (DNCI No. 11). In northern
Mozambique, wholesalers are mostly large-scale. These wholesalers buy maize from
domestic producers within the northern region, and sell it to large-scale maize millers,
non-governmental agencies (e.g. World Food Program) and/or export maize to
neighboring countries (e.g. Malawi). In contrast, dynamic small-scale wholesalers make
up the bulk of the maize wholesale sector in south/central Mozambique (Arlindo). On
average, informal wholesalers operating in centraVsouth Mozambique transact less than
10 tons/month (DNCI, No. 11).
2.5.3 Maize Retailers
The majority of maize retailers are informal, in the sense that they are not licensed and do
not pay taxes (DNCI, No.3). Informal retailing began to appear openly in the late 1980's,
soon after the beginning of the ERP-ESRP (MOAIMSU). Informal retailers have limited
access to formal credit, and they depend upon informal or family credit (DNCI, No. 11).
In 1992, the majority ofmaize retailers transacted about 50 kg/day and earned 6-27 % of
income needed to feed an average family (Tschirley). The size of the transactions is
likely to remain unchanged. Formal retailers usually have access to formal credit and
4 Figures were computed using data from DNeI, No. 12
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-own a truck. In addition to buying maize from fanners, they provide other services such
as transportation and maize milling, particularly in rural areas (DNCl, No. 11).
There are 10,718 operational formal retail shops in Mozambique of which 58 % are
located in the south, 18 % in central Mozambique and 25 % in the Norths. Maputo in the
south, Beira in the central region, and Narnpula in the north, represent the main retail
markets in Mozambique. Maputo, the capital of the country with over 1 million people in
2000, is fed by maize from the central region ofMozambique and by maize meal imports
from South Africa. Beira is the second largest city of Mozambique. It is fed by maize
surpluses from center, particularly Manica. Narnpula city, the major consumer center in
the north, is primarily fed by surpluses from within the province but occasionally receives
maize from Zambezia (Mocuba) (Tschirley and Santos).
2.5.4 Maize Millers
There are both formal and informal maize processors operating in Mozambique. The
formal milling sector comprises medium-scale and large-scale industrial millers that
produce fully de-germen meal (without germ and bran), and have a total milling capacity
of 132,500 metric tons a year. Ofthese, 74 % are in southern Mozambique, 3 % in the
central region, and 6 % in northern Mozambique (Muendane). Large-scale millers in
south Mozambique (e.g. ClM) rely on maize imports from South Africa, while those in
other regions buy maize locally. The formal milling sector produces less than 15 % of the
maize meals produced in Mozambique (Muendane).
5 Figures were computed using data from DNCI, No.l2
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The informal sector consists of small-scale hammer mills spread throughout the country.
Hammer mills and traditional hand-milling methods produce more than 80 % ofthe
maize meals produced in Mozambique (Muendane). Small-scale mills offer milling
services to their customers (consumers, small scale wholesalers/informal retailers) who
bring their own maize (own production or purchased) for milling. The main product made
by the informal hammer mills is whole meal. However, they also produce some fully de-
gennen meal when customers bring maize clean of germ and bran (MONMSU).
2.5.5 Maize Consumption
Maize is the main staple food in Mozambique. Despite the fact that most households
consume maize from their own production, maize still accounts for 15 % of the total food
expenditure on average (DPDS-UEM-IFPRI). White maize is preferred to yellow and
more processing is preferred to less. Hence, less refined yellow maize is the cheapest and
more refined white meal is the most expensive (MOA/MSU).
There are three main methods used to produce maize meal consumed in Mozambique.
There is hand-pounded meal, hammer-mill meal, and meal manufactured by large
commercial millers. Hand-pounded meal is a high-quality meal prepared at home by
manually removing the germ and bran of the maize grain by hand pounding and hand
sifting. The clean grain is refined through a second hand-pounding in pi/ao, or hand-
pounding in aldidar. The pi/ao-meal (maize flour) can be kept for several days but the
aldidar-meal (a pasta of maize and water) is cooked and consumed immediately as com
bread or as chima. The chima is prepared by placing maize paste in boiling water, little
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by little until it gains the desired consistency, and then letting it cook in low heat. To
produce whole meals using hammer mills, dry maize is placed into the hammer-mill and
then grounded to produce several grades of maize flour. Sometimes consumers fIrst
pound the grain by hand, to remove germ and bran, and then take it to a small custom
hammer miner to produce high quality meal. Large commercial millers can also
mechanically sift the maize grain and produce high quality meal (MOA/MSU).
2.6 Market Information and Transportation Infrastructure
Information has economic value. Market prices, resulting from actions of both buyers and
sellers, often reflect storage availability, transportation costs, political environment,
weather and prices in neighboring countries. Usually, market participants observe market
prices, and then decide how and when to allocate their scarce resources. The key is
getting timely market information.
The Sistema de Informacao the Mercado (SIMA), a public outlook program in
Mozambique, monitors maize prices in twenty-five domestic maize markets and in
neighboring countries. However, given that the SIMA information is provided in printed
weekly bulletins and via e-mail, it can only be timely acquired in major urban centers.
Under these circumstances, some market agents will have systematic informational
advantages over others, and long lags in maize price transmission across space are to be
expected.
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-In addition to limited access to market infonnation, maize traders in Mozambique face
transportation problems (DNCI, No. 3~ ONCI No. 11). Most of the transportation system
in Mozambique was built during the colonial period and is underdeveloped. The network
design suggests that the concern was to link Mozambique with her neighboring countries
rather than establishing transportation linkages between different regions within the
country. The approach does not seem to have changed in post-independence
Mozambique. While the corridors (Maputo, Beira and Nacala) linking Mozambique to
the hinterland were improved, and have well maintained roads, railways and ports, there
is no single railway or roadway connecting northern with southern Mozambique (see
figure 2.2). Foreign markets are "closer" than the nearest domestic market in much of
Mozambique (World Bank).
Approximately 13 % of the total load and almost all maize are transported by roadways
in Mozambique. However, the road network is poor. Approximately 53 % of the roads in
Mozambique are not paved (DNC, No 18). As a result most roadways are impassable
during the rainy season. In 2001, maize transportation costs ranged between $0.03 to
$0.21 ton/kilometer. Transportation cost was about 50 % of the maize price in Maputo
(DNC, No. 18).
Currently, there is no road connection between northern Mozambique and other regions
of the country. The road between maize surplus regions in northern Mozambique, and
maize deficit regions in southern Mozambique, stops at Caia on the border between
Sofala (Beira) and Zambezia (Mocuba) provinces (see figure 2.2). A ferry is used to cross
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Figure 2.2. Type ofRoads in Mozambique and Location of the Markets Included
in the Study_
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the Zambezi River until Zambezia where the road resumes again. However, the ferry is
not always available. For example, in early 200t the ferry was shut down for nearly two
months because the Zambezi River was flooding, and in July 2001 the ferry service was
interrupted again but for a different reason: there was not enough water in the river (AIM,
No. 211). In much of the rainy season, road traffic between Zambezia and other regions
of central Mozambique is forced to go through Malawi (DNCI, No 18). A proposed
bridge crossing the Zambezi River at Caia is budgeted at $80 million, and is among the
priorities of the GoM. While this bridge would allow North-South road connection and
ease the transportation of maize and other products within Mozambique, critics
(including the World Bank) claim that there is not enough traffic to justify the investment
(AIM, No 209).
Although more than 80% of the total load in Mozambique is carried on railways and
maritime transportation, maize is mainly transported on trucks. The reasons are as
follows. First, there is no railway connecting northern with southern Mozambique. The
railways link Mozambique to neighbors in the west. For example, the railway connection
between central and southern Mozambique goes through Zimbabwe. Hence, using
railways would result in long transportation distances. Second, while Mozambique has a
high potential for maritime transportation due to its long seacoast to the east, secondary
ports have some operational problems and tertiary ports beg for rehabilitation (DNC, No.
18). For example, in early 2001 maritime transport cost of shipping maize from Canada
to Maputo was lower than the cost of shipping maize from central/Northern Mozambique
to Maputo (DNC, No. 18).
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As a result, the connection between (maize surplus/deficit) districts with
secondary/primary ports, which would ideally be made through tertiary ports, is made by
roadways (which are at times impassable), and/or through railroads where they exist.
In summary, although the average nominal fees for railways ($0.03 - $0.05 tonlkm) and
for maritime transport are lower than the average cost of road transportation, maize
traders prefer the latter due to lack of security, high handling losses, and higher
transportation time in the former.
2.7 Storage and Credit Arrangements
The pattern of maize demand and supply in Mozambique is affected by geographical
maize storage concentration. On-farm or near rural areas, storage costs are higher than in
urban areas (Arndt et al.) where previous state monopolies concentrated about 235,000
metric tons of usable storage. In general, maize producers store some maize for their ovm
consumption, and traders can only afford to store maize in quantities equal to the size of
the current (small) transaction. Because most farmers sen their maize shortly after harvest
(March-April), maize prices fall shortly after harvest, but increase rapidly as the stock of
maize held by households decreases. As maize sellers become maize buyers, price
inversions and flow reversals between urban centers and rural producing areas can occur
(Timmer).
The majority of maize traders also face high capital costs. First, fonnal credit institutions
serve less than 15% of the Mozambican population mostly in urban areas (Larson).
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Second, the nominal rate of interest offered by the commercial banking system (23% to
28% in 1999) and NGOs-based micro-finance programs (64 % to 107 %) remains high.
Further, the maturity period is about three months while maize transactions often last
three to nine months (DNCI, No. 11). Third, while most of the traders are poor and have
agriculture as the main source of income in Mozambique (Benfica), fonnallending
institutions require an up front payment of 25-30 % of the loan. In addition, the formal
financial institutions require borrowers to own possessions equal to the loan amount
(DNCI, No. 11). Traders' working capital depends upon personal savings and infonnal
credit schemes.
High capital costs contribute to small-scale maize transactions. For example, the average
maize retailer trades less than 50 Kg/day, and an infonnal wholesaler does not transact
more than 10-15 ton every two weeks. In 1997, a wholesaler working in the route
Chimoio-Maputo had annual capital returns of381 % for transactions of3.5 ton per two
weeks, and 107 % for transactions of 12.5 ton per two weeks (Tschirley). These high
nominal returns to capital reflect high cost of capital, and small size of maize transaction.
2.8 Summary
Maize is the main staple crop in Mozambique, an overwhelmingly agricultural country
with high poverty incidence. Despite the fact that the south is a deficit region in all years,
and northern Mozambique has a potential to greatly increase production, interregional
maize shipments records show that grain is not being shipped from northern to southern
Mozambique, and subsistence agriculture is the common practice in much of
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Mozambique. The majority of maize producers are smallholders that rely on rainfed
agriculture and manual tools. Although most rural households farm maize, maize and
maize meals still account for 15% of their food budget.
The number of maize traders has increased in the post-reform period, but the size of
maize transactions remains small. Maize is inspected and paid upon delivery. Usually,
cash payments are made without invoicing, a practice that complicates accounting. Lack
of accounting further limits the possibility of getting a loan from formal lending
institutions. Because traders face limited access to roads, credit and information, lagged
price responses are expected in spatial price transmission. Further, poor access to roads,
credit and information limit trader's ability to arbitrage maize prices throughout
Mozambique. Some inefficiency on spatial maize arbitrage is expected.
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CHAPTERllI
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
Throughout the past 15 years, Mozambique has liberalized its food markets and promoted
market based solutions, yet food shortages persist. The persisting problem of maize
shortages and price instability can be minimized if spatial maize markets are linked by
trade. When markets are linked by trade, price signals from maize deficit regions are
(timely) transmitted to maize surplus regions, and arbitrageurs trigger flow of food from
food surplus regions to food deficit areas minimizing food shortages. This is the basic
notion of Walrasian transfer of excess demand.
This chapter provides the theory used to measure the efficiency of spatial arbitrage and
the lead-lag relationships between spatial maize prices in Mozambique. The concepts of
arbitrage efficiency and market integration are discussed in section 3.2. Section 3.3
discusses maize price dynamics, and section 3.4 presents the chapter's summary.
3.2 Arbitrage Efficiency and Market Integration
The concept of market integration is related to (free) flow of goods and information over
space, time, and form. However, operational definitions of market integration used in
empirical studies are far from reaching a consensus. The term market integration is often
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used to describe spatial price efficiency (Barrett). Here, markets are defined as integrated
if there are physical flows of product from one to another. Integration, therefore, implies
(Walsarian) transfer ofexcess demand from one market to another. This transfer of
excess demand is noticeable through physical maize flows, or transmission of price
shocks from one market to another, or both (Barrett). Because spatial trade depends upon
prices, transfer costs and commodity flows, attempts to make inference about market
integration using only prices, like much of current literature, can be hazardous (Harris;
McNew and Fackler; Baulch; Li and Barrett; Obstfeld and Taylor; Barrett). The main
inferential difficulty is caused by trade discontinuities (due to a third trading partner,
and/or large transaction costs) and nonstationary prices and transfer costs (due to
inflation, climate shock or population).
Here, a measure of spatial arbitrage efficiency is combined with records of interregional
trade shipments to make inference about market integration. Although they are closely
related, market integration and market efficiency are not the same (Li and Barrett).
Arbitrage is efficient if arbitrageurs force maize prices to converge toward transfer costs
whenever the maize price differential exceeds transfer costs. Thus, trade occurring is a
sufficient condition for market integration, but spatial arbitrage efficiency requires that
sufficient trade occur so that price spreads are less than transfer costs.
Throughout the past decade, the Mozambican maize market has been increasingly
liberalized. The proponents of the reforms claimed that by removing official prices,
producer prices would rise creating incentives for farmers to increase production. With
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-higher prices, farmers would then regard maize as cash crops and shift their orientation
from subsistence to commercial producers (Dembele and Staaz). Further, elimination of
market constraints (legal, institutional) would reduce transaction costs, attract more
traders into the market, lead to trader's specialization further reducing unit marketing
costs (Dembele and Staaz). Without restriction to trade, maize shortages and gluts would
be eliminated. A well functioning market would encourage private investment in maize
production and marketing.
The study hypothesis follows from the discussion above: liberalizing maize markets leads
to efficient arbitrage and market integration. When arbitrage is efficient, food shortages
in deficit regions are transmitted to surplus regions via prices, and arbitrage triggers flows
of food across space. The risk of crop failure in some regions is shared over a large
market area, prices are more stable, and food shortages may be prevented. Trade and
specialization is the key for economic growth (Drucker), especially in Mozambique
where agriculture is the main source offamily income (Benfica) and 75 % of the
population grows maize (DPDS-UEM-IFPRl).
To examine interregional maize trade in Mozambique, where the northern and central
regions are maize surplus regions (in normal years) and the south is a maize deficit
region, consider a two-region trade model (see figure 3.2.1) in which excess demand
( E(D ) and excess supply ( E(s) at time tare:
(1) E(D = f(p/ ,T'/()
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(2) E,S =h(P/ ,f,,)
where pA and pB are respectively the prices in the importing region (A) and in the
exporting region (B); and 7], and ~, represent respectively exogenous demand and supply
shifters such as weather or population. Let C be the transfer cost of shipping maize from
B to A in period t. When markets A and B are linked by trade, arbitrageurs ship maize
from B to A and force the price differential between regions A and B to be less than or
Figure 3.2.1: Schematic of Two-Region Maize Trading Model
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The equality in (3) defines spatial arbitrage conditions consistent with maize spatial
market integration (Ravallion; Harris; Baulch; Sexton, Kling and Cannan). Expression
(3) indicates that transfer costs determine th.e bounds within which a commodity is
tradable, and is consistent with markets that produce and consume maize, as in
Mozambique and most countries in the SA region.
Most approaches used to test spatial market integration (e.g. bivariate price correlations,
cointegration, error correction models, threshold autoregression, and cointegration) use
price data alone and, therefore, are inconsistent with the spatial arbitrage conditions
described by (3). When these price-based methods are used to make inferences about
market integration, unaccounted nonstationary transfer costs and trade discontinuities
may cause biased and inconsistent parameter estimates (McNew and Fackler; Barrett).
As a result, well functioning markets are deemed to be functionally isolated, and regions
without trade links are found to be price correlated and, therefore, deemed to be spatially
integrated (Harris; Baulch; Barrett).
Newly developed methods to assess spatial arbitrage (e.g. Baulch's PBM, and Barrett and
Li's BLM) use switching regressions to account for multiple regimes that can emerge
from considering prices and transfer costs (Sexton, Kling and Carman; Baulch), and from
considering prices, transfer costs, and trade flows (Li and Barrett). These methods
account for nonstationary transfer costs, recognize discontinuous trade patterns, and are
consistent with characteristics of Mozambique food markets where markets are not
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-specialized, and time-series data are short. When trade data are available, these methods
can account for interseasonal flow reversals that are common when transportation and
storage infrastructure is poor (Barrett). Here, the Baulch's parity bOWld model (PBM) is
used to test for arbitrage efficiency and, together with records of interregional maize
shipments, make inferences about market integration.
3.3 Maize Price Dynamics
While the spatial trade model in (3) uses switching regression to prevent inferential flaws
caused by nonstationary transfer costs and trade discontinuities (McNew and Fackler; Li
and Barrett; Baulch; Barret!; Ravallion), the procedure does not capture lagged price
adjustments to tradability or equilibrium6. At equilibrium, the market clears if,
(4)
By simultaneously solving the static equations (l), (2) and (4), a reduced form of
equilibrium maize price can be obtained,
(5)
6 When markets trade continuously, a perfectly competitive market must be integrated (Goldberg and
Knetter). However, when trade is discontinuous (comer solutions indicate no trade), it is possible to have a
segmented equilibrium. Given that trade can occur without perfect competition (like in the presence of
binding quotas), integration is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for equilibrium, nor vice versa
(Li and Barrett)
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where p,e,i are the equilibrium prices (i = A, B) and () =(pA, pB ,T],~). Reduced form
equations similar to (5) are simple, easy to estimate and were found to be useful in
analyzing the effects of shifts on demand or supply on commodity price by Gardner.
Given that many of the roads in Mozambique are poor and market information is
acquired with some delay, transportation and information lags are likely to occur.
Frictions due to information and interregional shipping costs generate dynamic price
adjustment. Some markets may lead others in the price discovery process resulting in
lead-lag price relationships. In these circumstances, an understanding of how fast maize
markets adjust to (exogenous) shocks is important for economic policy formation because
it provides information about the price discovery process and the characteristics of the
market (e.g. size). With time lags, however, static models like equation (5) are unsuitable
because they do not capture dynamic price adjustments. Nevertheless, they can be made
dynamic by incorporating information contained in both past and present structural
shifters. Thus, equation (5) can be rewritten as,
(6)
In practice, however, expression (6) is difficult to estimate because it is complex to
measure the effects of all excess demand and supply shifters at any period of time. If one
is willing to assume that these shifters generate a stochastic process that is identifiable,
then time series modeling can be used to indirectly model and estimate such stochastic
processes (Boyd and Brorsen). Hence, equation (6) can be expressed as,
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(7) ~t,i =~ +S, +e"
where T, is the deterministic component representing trends (e.g. seasonality, road
quality) and S/ + e/ is the stochastic component reflecting how markets respond to new
information. The processS, is assumed to be covariance stationary (short memory). It
would be equal to zero if the market adjusted instantaneously. The error tenn e, is
assumed to be white noise, which implies that all information embedded in the data has
been captured.
Equilibrium prices (described by (7)) at a given market are expected to be simultaneously
detennined by their own past prices and past prices of other regional markets trading with
it. Multivariate time series procedures can be used to model simultaneous dynamic
relationships underlying the stochastic process of equation (7).
3.4 Summary
The study hypothesis and the spatial trade theol)' used to measure the efficiency of
market arbitrage and make inferences about market integration were discussed in this
chapter. The liberalization of maize markets in Mozambique is expected to foster spatial
trade links and minimize food shortages and price instability.
This chapter also found that price-based methods often overlook transfer costs and trade
discontinuities leading to erroneous conclusions about market integration. Unlike price-
based methods, switching regression methods (combining price and transfer cost) prevent
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-faulty inference because they account for multiple trade regimes that emerge from
considering transfer costs and trade discontinuities.
Because simple switching regressions, like the one proposed in this study, do not accoWlt
for lagged price adjustments that are expected in Mozambique maize markets (where
market agents have different access to roads and information), time series procedures will
be used to capture maize price dynamic price adjustments and measure the lead-lag
relationships between spatial maize prices in Mozambique.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA AND MODELING PROCEDURES
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the data and methods used to accomplish the objectives of the
study. The plan of the chapter is as follows. The data, time periods covered, and data
sources are presented in section 4.2. Next, section 4.3 discusses the switching regression
used to measure maize price arbitrage efficiency. Time series procedures used to capture
dynamic price relationships between maize markets are discussed in section 4.4. Finally,
section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Data
The test for spatial arbitrage efficiency uses monthly white maize retail prices and
monthly transportation cost data. Weekly maize retail prices are utilized in dynamic time-
series models to capture dynamic relationships between spatial maize prices. All maize
price data (1994 - 200 I) were gathered in the post-reform period, and are from the
Sistema de Injormacao de Mercados (SIMA), a public outlook program. The SIMA data
are gathered by interviewing randomly selected retailers in each province (three
interviews per week). Trained technicians conduct the interviews. Monthly retail maize
prices of the ten markets considered in this study are plotted in figures 4.1 and 4.2, and
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Figure 4.1. Monthly Retail Maize Prices in Northern Mozambique (MeticaisIKg),
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descriptive statistics of weekly retail maize prices are presented in table 4.1. As figures
4.1 and 4.2 show, nominal retail maize prices show no distinct trend and follow a
seasonal pattern. The prices begin rising around September reaching a maximum around
March. Seasonal maize price decreases are correlated with maize harvest season, which
extends from March to late April. As table 4.1 indicates, average prices in southern
Mozambique are almost a double the prices in central/northern Mozambique but price
volatility around the mean is higher in northern/central Mozambique (see table 4.1).
Southern Mozambique is a maize deficit region but has better market infrastructure than
the northern maize surplus regions. As table 4.1 also indicates, price data have large
information gaps. The number of missing values varies from one (Maputo) to one
hundred and seven (Lichinga).
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Weekly Maize Retail Prices in Mozambique
(Meticais/Kilogram) between July 2, 1994 and April 4, 2001.
Standard Number of
Variable N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Missing Values
Maputo 356 2608.36 665.21 941.18 4042.95
Chokwe 260 2470.20 898.05 857.14 6095.24 96
Maxixe 352 2112.20 735.35 800.00 5600.00 4
Beira 329 1887.92 813.81 457.14 5657.14 27
Chimoio 347 1745.42 807.23 342.86 5428.57 9
Tete 313 1423.21 607.10 552.38 3430.30 43
Mocuba 305 1308.20 712.12 314.29 37]4.29 51
Nampula 343 1472.59 719.86 514.29 4313.73 13
Pemba 294 1616.50 717.12 450.00 4571.43 62
Lichinga 249 1677.70 895.39 485.71 4666.67 107
Monthly CPI
2001 = 100 89 73.65 20.59 29.19 100 0
Note: The monthly price index (CPI) for the period January 1994 - May 200 l.
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Missing values represent lost information and make regression estimation more difficult.
Despite that, the price data used in the regression estimation does not include any
interpolated values.
Road transportation cost data used to extrapolate eight years of time-series transportation
cost are presented in tables 4.2 and 4.3. The data are from the Ministry of Trade and
Table 4.2. Interregional Maize Transportation Cost in Mozambique (Meticaislbag)
between August 29 and November 29,2001.
Destination Market
Maize Vilanculos Quelimane
Source Maputo Xai-Xai Maxixe Beira Tete (Maxixe) (Mocuba)
Chokwe 17,000
(n = 1)
Chimoio 65,000 30,000 30,000
(n= 8) (n = 1) (n = I)
Manica 50,000 55,000 50,000
(n = 1) (n = 1) (n =2)
Tete 100,000 40,000
(n = 1) (n = I)
Angonia 70,000 25,000
(Tete) (n = 1) (n = 2)
Nampula 150,000 148,000 127,000 120,000
(n = 1) (n = 4) (n =7) (n = 2)
Lichinga 124,000 85,000 100,000
(n = 5) (n = 1) (n = 2)
South Africa 31,000
(n=9)
Notes: The number of observations is given in parentheses. Maize bags have a capacity of 75-100 kilos.
U.S, $1 '" 23,000 Meticais. The data were compiled from the SIMA weekly bulletins (August 29 and November 29,
2001).
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Table 4.3. Road Maize Transportation Costs in Mozambique (MZM/ton/Km), June 2001
Destination
Xa-Xai Inhambane Sofala Manica Zambezia
Source Maputo (Chokwe) (Maxixe) (Beira) (Chimoio) Tete (Mocuba) Nampula Pemba Lichinga
Maputo L120 1,122 800 800 800 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
Xai-Xai 909
(Chokwe)
Manica 400
(Chimoio)
Tete 637 633 615
~
tv
Nampula 1,303 L338 1,260 1,572 1,532 1,142 1,483 1,231
Pemba 905 1,198
South Africa 960
Note: The exchange rate during data gathering was $\ = 16,000 MZM.
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry, DNC No. 18
1
Industry (one observation in June 2001) and from the SIMA (weekly data gathered
between August and September 2001). When the average per unit transfer cost between
the two sources of data (SIMA and Ministry of Trade and Industry) is different, the value
used to project time-series cost data is the highest between the two, except when the
average transfer cost of one of the sources is based on more observations than the other.
This choice allows conservative estimates of cost data. Transport costs are established by
bag and by location, and vary between U.S. $0.03 and U.S. $0.1 per kilometer. Per unit
maize transportation costs decrease with the distance and the size of the truck. Nampula,
which has the poorest roads, has the highest transportation charges per kilometer.
As suggested by Baulch, a consumer price index (CPI) was used to extrapolate available
cost data into eight years of monthly time-series transportation cost data (a proxy for
transfer cost). The monthly CPI for all Mozambique is from the Instituto Nacional de
Estatistica (lNE), a Mozambican public institution. Monthly diesel prices are used as an
alternative deflator, to provide a test of fragility. The Direccao Nacional de Energia
provided the diesel prices. Both CPI and diesel price indexes for Lichinga and Beira are
plotted in figure 4.3. All other diesel-index curves fall in between Lichinga and Beira
curves. As figure 4.4 shows, the CPI is higher than diesel prices (almost a double the
diesel prices in Beira) during the period considered. Using diesel prices as a deflator
leads to higher estimated transportation costs and, therefore, less spatial arbitrage
inefficiency.
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Figure 4.3. Monthly cpr for All Mozambique, and Monthly Diesel Price Indexes
for Beira and Lichinga Provinces between February 1995 and June 2001.
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The extrapolated cost data, which are used as initial transfer-cost estimates on the PBM,
seems to be higher but reasonable. For example, using initial cost estimates on the PBM
seems to be higher but reasonable. For example, using the CPI as a deflator, the
extrapolated transfer cost for the route Chimoio-Maputo in December of 1995 (U.S.
$0.07/ton/kilometer) is more conservative than Coulter's (1995) estimate of U.S. $0.03 .
$ O.OS/ton per kilometer for the same period. The Ministry of trade and Industry's (DNCI
No.3) estimate of transportation costs to transport maize from Chimoio to Maputo in
December of 1998 (369 Meticais per kilogram) is less than the deflated value of (487
Meticais/ton per kilometer) used in this study. High values of cost estimates may lead to
conservative estimates of spatial arbitrage efficiency.
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4.3 Testing for Arbitrage Efficiency
The test for spatial arbitrage efficiency uses Baulch's parity bound model (PBM), a
switching regression with three regimes. The probability for each regime is established in
two stages. First, the transfer-cost data are extrapolated into time-series data by deflating
them with a consumer price index or diesel price. Second, a maximwn-likelihood
estimator (MLE) is used to estimate the lower and upper parity bounds (the range in
which price spreads are considered equal to transfer costs).
The three regimes involved in the PBM estimation are as foHows. Regime I is at the
parity bounds, and is defined when maize price spreads between two provinces equal
where p/ and p,B are maize retail prices in markets A and B (e.g. Maputo and Beira
lnl p,B -p/ 1= InC, +e,(8)
transfer cost 7. That is,
provinces); Ct is the nominal transfer cost; et is the error tenn that captures variations on
transfer costs due to seasonality or changing capacity utilization on the transportation
sector. This error term is assumed to be iid Nonnal(O, 0"; ). Regime II is inside the
parity bounds, and is defined when price spreads are less than transfer costs,
(9)
7 This study uses transportation costs as a proxy for transfer costs, which include transportation costs, tariffs, indirect
costs and unobservable profit margins.
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where u/ is an error term that captures the extent to which prices fall short of parity
bounds when there is no incentive to trade. It depends upon relative differences in
demand and supply in individual markets, and is assumed to be iid Nonnal(O,o-;) and
truncated from above (at zero). Regime III is outside the parity bounds and is defined
when price spreads exceed transfer costs. That is,
(10) lnl p/ -p/ 1=lnC( +e, +V(
where VI is an error term capturing the extent to which price spreads are in excess of
transfer costs when spatial arbitrage conditions are violated. Its size depends upon the
extent to which intennarket trade is prevented due to government controls, transportation
restrictions or any other impediments to trade such as lack of roads.
The problem consists of estimating the probability of each trade regime, given maize
prices and transfer cost data. Regime one and two are consistent with efficient spatial
arbitrage, and regime III indicates market inefficiency. The likelihood function of the
PBM is defined as (Weinstein; Sexton, Kling and Carman; Baulch):
(11)
where Al and A2 are the probabilities for regime I when price spreads equal and fall
below transfer costs respectively. The function f/ is the density function for regimes I
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-(i.e. spreads equal transfer costs) defined as:
(12)
t; is the density function for regime II (i.e. spreads less than transfer costs), and is
defined as:
The density functions for regime III is:
and t; is the density function for regime III when price spreads exceed transfer costs.
(14)
(13)
where Yt is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of price difference between
markets i andj; (ie' (iii' and a. are standard deviations of the error term, respectively
el , U/' and VI; C, is the logarithm of the nominal transportation cost in period t, and ~(.)
and <I> (.) represent the standard normal density and distribution function respectively.
The estimates of the parameters AI, ..h, a., (iii and a" are obtained by maximizing the
likelihood function (14) using TSP version 4.4 (see appendix A). The selected option
47
ML(HCOV = D, HITER = D, TOL = 0.0 I) calls for the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell
algorithm (that uses numeric derivatives and is helpful with bad starting values) with a
convergence criterion of 0.01 (TSP User's Guide). The option ANALYZ (in TSP version
4.4) is used to compute the standard errors of the unconstrained regime probabilities and
conduct (Wald) t-tests.
Mozambique has poor roads and information lags. Therefore, instead of testing the null
of perfect spatial efficiency (AI + ,1,2 = 1), this study focuses on the magnitude of the
regime probabilities. The sum of probabilities ofregime one (i.e. spreads equal to transfer
costs) and two (i.e. price spreads less than transport costs) is interpreted as the frequency
of market efficiency. That is, the more efficient spatial arbitrage is, the closer to zero is
the index of market inefficiency ,1,3 (,1,3 = I-AI + ..1.2),
4.4 Maize Price Dynamics
The switching regression discussed in section 4.3 provides information about the extent
to which spatial markets trade together. However, dynamic adjustments that are expected
due to information and transportation lags are not captured. This section uses time-series
models to determine the lead-lag relationships between spatial maize prices and make
inferences about maize-price discovery.
With lagged price transmission, the quantity of maize traded in each market, the distance
between markets, and the quality of roads between markets are expected to influence the
size or length of dynamic adjustments. Larger markets (e.g. Maputo, Beira and Nampula)
48
are expected to lead the price discovery process, and shorter distances and paved roads
are expected to favor rapid spatial price transmission and adjustment. The procedures
used to detennine the appropriate fonn of dynamic models are presented in figure 4.4. As
figure 4.4 shows, maize prices are first tested for unit roots. If the null of a unit root is
rejected, maize price dynamics are modeled with a vector autoregression (VAR) using
price levels. However, if the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected, maize prices are
treated as if they were unit root processes and, hence, tested for cointegration. Maize
prices with a urnt root are modeled with an error correction model if they are
cointegrated, or with a VAR in first differences if they are not cointegrated. A VAR is
preferred over a vector autoregressive moving average (VARMA) because it is easier to
identify and to interpret its results.
Figure 4.4: Procedures to Specify Dynamic Time-Series Models
yes
~
VARin
differences
Note: VAR means vector autoregression
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-4.4.1 Stationarity and Unit Root Testi.ng
Time series data are stationary if they have a constant mean over time, and the covariance
between two members depends only on the time span between them (Judge et al.). When
data are not stationary, they have a "unit root". Inflation, population, weather and other
common trends may make agricultural prices nonstationary (Ravallion; Harris; Barrett).
Regression of one unit root process on another may result in spurious regression in that
the R2 would be high, the t-statistic significant but the results lack economic meaning
(Enders; Davidson and Mackinnon).
The SAS software version 8e is used to test the null of a unit root on maize prices. The
macro %dftest (AR =, DLAG =1, TREND = 2) calls for the augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test with three lags, an intercept and a time trend. The procedure is repeated
without a time trend (i.e. TREND = 1). When a time trend and an intercept are included,
the ADF regression is,
(16)
p-I
ll.y, = J1 + fit + IY,-l + L¢jll.Y'-J + C,
j-I
where p is the lag length, and c, is a white noise error term and Y is the price series
considered. Under the null hypothesis of no unit roots, the test statistic does not have a t-
distribution, but Davidson and Mackinnon (p. 708) tabulated asymptotic critical values
using Monte Carlo experiments. A number of unit-root testing procedures are available in
the literature (e.g. Phillips-Oularis test; Phillips-Perron test) but they all have low power
and none ofthem is uniformly more powerful than others (Maddala and Kim; Davison
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-and Mackinnon; Enders). If the null of a unit root is rejected, a VAR is used to model
price dynamics. However, if the null is not rejected, maize prices are treated as if they
were unit root processes and, hence, tested for cointegration.
4.4.2 CointegratioD Tests
In the long run, common stochastic trends (such as inflation, population and weather)
may prevent non-stationary agricultural commodity prices from drifting too far apart. In
Engle and Granger's own words (p. 251), "if each element of a vector of time-series y,
achieves stationarity after differencing but a linear combination By, is already stationary,
the time-series y is said to be cointegrated with a cointegrating vector B."
There are many procedures to test for cointegration, but none of them is unifonnly most
powerful. Maddala and Kim reviewed Monte Carlo studies assessing the perfonnance of
cointegration tests and found conflicting results. For example, they point out that while
Gregory (1994) found that the ADF and the Phillips-Perron (PP) statistics have better size
and power properties than the Johansen cointegration statistics, I-Iaug found that the
Johansen and Juselius cointegration statistic (Amax) has the least size distortions. Further,
Eitrheim argues that the Johansen statistics have low power against near cointegration
alternatives.
The Engle and Granger (EG) two-step procedure can be used to test for cointegration on
maize prices that have a unit root and the same order of integration. First, each maize
price series is regressed against all other (non-stationary) prices and an intercept,
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(17)
where Yit (i = 1... k) are non-stationary maize prices, ~j (j = 0,2...k) are the cointegrating
parameters and e/ is a vector of error terms. Second, the residuals from the first step are
tested for unit root using the ADF test. The EO test is based on the following auxiliary
regressiOn,
does not follow a t-distribution, but Davidson and Mackinnon (p.722) tabulated critical
under the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals (no cointegration), the test statistic
(18)
p-I
6.e, = re,-I + L ¢Jj 6.el _ J + G(
j=l
,~
I~
-
values using Monte Carlo simulations. If the null of unit root (no cointegration) is
rejected, the dynamic model is specified as an error-correction model. However, if the
null is not rejected a VAR in first differences is estimated.
4.4.3 Vector Autoregression and Error Correction Models
The procedure used to measure maize price dynamics of regional maize markets in
Mozambique will utilize a multivariate vector autoregression or an error-correction
model depending on whether or not prices are cointegrated (see figure 4.5)8.
8 Since maize prices were found to be stationary in levels (see section 5.3), two vector autoregressions were
estimated using maize price levels. One VAR used maize prices in southern/central Mozambique, and the
other VAR used maize prices of the markets in northern Mozambique. The decision of which markets to
include in each VAR was based upon PBM estimates and data on interregional maize shippments discussed
in section 5.2.
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A VAR can be thought of as the reduced fonn of a structural model in which all variables
in the system are endogenous. Such a specification obviates subjective decisions as to
which variables are exogenous and, hence, prevents spurious dynamic specification
(Greene). The VAR can be represented as,
(19) pY;=n+I
i=l
x Yt - p + 1](season) + V t
where Y, is a K x 1 vector of maize prices «Y; = (y(( ,...,YKt)') in logarithm form; 1l is a
V( is a vector ofmultivariate white noise error terms (VI = (VIP'''' vkl )'); 77(season) captures
K-dimensional vector of constants (1l = (1l1 , ••• , 1lK )'); a j is a K x K matrix parameters;
aKK,iaK1,i
periodicity,
(20) 7](season) = f3 sin(2m / 26) + (0 sin(2m / 52) + cp cos(21lt / 26) + r/J cos(21lt /52) ,
and f3 , (jJ , qJ, and ¢ are vectors of parameters similar to 1l . The time subscript is
indicated by t, and p is the order of the VAR.
If maize prices are cointegrated, an ECM is specified to capture maize price dynamics:
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(21)
p
.1.Y, =r + llY,_1 +L 'Pj .1.f-i + T](season) + J.J/
;=1
where ilY, is a vector of maize prices in first differences; r is a vector of constants; n is
a matrix of coefficients 7tij such that at least one 7tij is not zero; 'P; is a matrix of
coefficients; PI is a vector of error terms, and rJ(season) is as defined in (19). Notice that if
all elements of I1 are zero, expression (23) is simply a VAR in first differences.
Seemingly wrrelated regression is used to estimate the coefficients of the VAR and/or
ECM (Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand) using SAS software version-8e.
4.4.3.1 Lag Length Selection
Before estimating a VAR or an ECM it is necessary to estimate the lag length of the
stochastic process. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwartz's Criterion
(BIC), and sequential F-tests can be used to estimate the lag length (Greene). In addition
to using a pretest estimator whose properties are unknown, sequential F-tests are also
disadvantageous when the sample data are short because they can result in longer lags
(Greene). Both the AlC and the BIC reflect trade offs between accuracy and parsimony,
but the BIC uses heavier penalty for additional pararneters (Greene), which leads to a
simpler model.
In this study, both AlC and sequential F-tests were discarded because they yielded long
lags lengths and insufficient degrees of freedom for hypothesis testing. The BIC+2
(Pantula, Gonzalez-Farias, and Fuller) is used in this study. The BIC+2 procedure
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consists of finding the lag length with the BIC and then adding two more lags. This
procedure allows a balance between shorter lags, which would result from using the
"usual" HIC, and long lags that would result from using other procedures such as the AIC
or sequential F-tests. With randomly occurring missing values, long lags would
"generate" more missing values resulting in fewer degrees of freedom, and bias and
inconsistency of parameter estimates.
To allow differences in lag lengths between equations that may arise due to differences in
roads and information lags, the BIC+2 is implemented in two steps. First, each maize
price regressed on its own lags, and the lag order with minimum BIC is selected. Second,
each maize price is regressed against the lags of all other prices (due to missing values,
the maximum lag allowed was five) given its own lag length selected in the first step. The
lag length with minimum BIC is selected and two more lags added for all regressors. The
TSP- 4.4 software is used to estimate the BIC. The BIC weights parsimony and accuracy
and is given by (Judge et a1.),
..
(22) - InTBIC(p) =log (det L,,) + M 2n-
T
-
where M is the number of variables in the system, T is the sample size, and detL" is
the determinant of the estimated residual covariance matrix which is computed as,
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t n = (Y - xB)'(Y - XB) .
T
With the BIC+2 procedure, the value of the lag length (P) is found that minimizes (22),
and the length oflag selected is p+2.
4.4.3.2 Diagnostic Procedures
Time series techniques are intended to take advantage of autocorrelation embedded in the
...
Gaussian white noise, and the standard T-test and F-test are valid. This section tests the
If in addition to being white noise the residuals are normally distributed, then they are
E(c"cs ) = (J2 if t = s
=0, otherwise.
c, is white noise if
data to explain the economic phenomenon of interest. When all past information have
been used to explain the variable of interest, the error term should be white noise. That is,
assumptions that residuals of dynamic models are white noise and nonnally distributed.
Following a recommendation by McGuirk, Driscoll, and Alwang, Engle's two-step
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic is used to jointly test for general autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH). As such, the estimated residuals from each
equation of the VAR or ECM are recovered and then used to estimate an auxiliary
regreSSIOn:
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(23)
under the null of no ARCH (or GARCH) and a sample of N observations, the statistic
NR2 converges in distribution to a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom
(NR 2 - ;(.2). In this study, an asymptotic F-type test is used to jointly test the residuals
for heteroskedasticity. The F-test is also asymptotic but is preferred to an asymptotic chi-
squared test in small samples (McGuirk et al.). If the nuB hypothesis of homoskedaticity
is rejected, then maximum likelihood may be used to correct for heteroskedasticity.
The Breusch-Godfrey LM test is used to test for autocorrelation on the error of the
system of equations (VAR or ECM). The procedure tests for autoregressive or moving
average error terms of any order whether or not lagged dependent variables are included
as regressors (Greene; McGuirk et al.). Hence, this test is preferred to other tests (e.g.
Durbin-Watson test). An asymptotic F-test is used to test the joint null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation using the regression,
..
~
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(24)
where e, is a vector of residuals from the VAR or ECM; X is a vector of regressors and
fJ' , and A' are matrix of parameters to be estimated. Before estimating equation (26),
missing values are replaced with zeros. If the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is
rejected, the remedy is to increase the lag length of the VAR or ECM, stopping when the
null hypothesis is no longer rejected.
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The Kolrnogorov - Smimov test is used to test the residuals for normality. The procedure
compares the hypothesized theoretical normal distribution with the empirical one. The
null hypothesis is that the error tenns are nonnally distributed (Conover):
(25) T =sup! F·(y)-S(y) I
where F· (y) and S(y) are respectively the hypothesized and the empirical distribution of
the stochastic process. The SAS software-8e canned procedure used to test for normality
prints the p-values of the test. If the assumption of nonnality is violated, hypothesis
testing (t-test and F-test) can still be carried out appealing to the central limit theorem,
provided that the variance is homoskedatic. Some power, however, may be lost.
4.4.4 Lead-Lag Relationships Among Spatial Maize Markets
Factors such as the size and the location of the market (and, hence, access to roads, credit
and infonnation) often affect the speed of the market's response to exogenous shocks.
During the price discovery process, some markets may Granger cause or anticipate others
resulting in lead-lag relationships. Following Granger, a market X causes market Y if and
only if fis better predicted by using the past history ofX than by not doing so, with the
past history ofX being used in either case. That is, if f(~ I~_;, X,_i) equals
f(~ IY;-i) then X does not Granger cause Y.
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IfX causes Yand Y does not cause X, then X causes Y unidirectionaly. IfX does not
causes Y, and Y does not cause X, then X causes Yare statistically independent or related
contemporaneously. IfX causes Yand Y causes X, then there is feedback between X and
y. IfX causes Z and Z causes Y, then X indirectly causes Y.
By definition, if prices of two or more markets are cointegrated, there must be some
causality between them. However, cointegration says nothing about the direction of the
causal relationship. In a VAR context, a joint F-test is used to test the null hypothesis that
the coefficients of each independent variable do not Gointly) Granger cause the
dependent variable. Rejecting the null implies that the dependent variable under
consideration leads the dependent variable in the price discovery process.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has presented the data and modeling procedures used to accomplish the
objectives of this study. The test for arbitrage efficiency utilizes the PBM, a switching
regression model that combines price and transfer cost information. The PBM, which
accounts for discontinuous trade and nonstationarity of transfer cost data that cause
inferential problems on the popular price-based regressions, is estimated in two steps.
First, the average transfer cost for each maize route is extrapolated into a time-series by
deflating it with a consumer price index and diesel prices. Second, estimates of the lower
and upper parity bounds are obtained using maximum likelihood.
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The analysis ofprice dynamics (that may occur due to information and transportation
lags) uses a VAR and/or ECM depending on whether or not prices are cointegrated. In
the VAR context, a joint F-test is used to test for Granger causality tests and determine
the lead-lag relationships between interregional maize prices. Since the concept of
cointegration implies causality by itself, cointegrated markets must have some causal
relationship between them. Larger markets are expected to lead the price discovery. Short
distances, and access to information and roads, favor rapid spatial price transmission and
adjustment after exogenous shocks.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Introduction
The results of this study are provided and discussed in this chapter. First, section 5.2
discusses the PBM results used to make inferences about the efficiency of spatial
arbitrage. The sum of regime I probability (when price spreads equal transfer costs) and
regime II probability (when price spreads fall below transfer costs) provides a measure of
arbitrage efficiency. The probability of regime III (when price spreads exceed transfer
costs) reflects impediments to trade, and is interpreted as arbitrage inefficiency. Finally,
section 5.3 provides the results of the multivariate dynamic models. Multivariate Granger
causality tests between maize markets are used to make inferences about lead-lag
relationships between spatial maize prices.
5.2 Spatial Arbitrage Efficiency
The estimates of the PBM us.ing monthly maize retail prices and transportation costs
deflated by the cpr for all Mozambique are presented in table 5.1. As indicated by the
sum of the probabilities of regime r and II, spatial arbitrage is efficient 64 % to 66 % of
the time between markets within southern Mozambique (Maputo, Xai-Xai and Maxixe),
and 73 % to 83 % of the time between markets within central Mozambique (Tete, Beira,
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Table 5.1. Estimates of the PBM Regime Probabilities for Mozambique Maize Retail
Markets Using CPI as a Deflator to Project Transfer Costs.
PBM Regime Probabilities
Maize Route Regime 1 Regime II Regime III
Chimoio ~ Xai-Xai 0.653 0.2E-02 0.346
(0.00) (0.425) (0.00)
Maputo~ Beira 0.491 0.IE-02 0.507
(0.00) (0.58) (0.00)
Chimoio ~ Maputo 0.IE-02 0.916 0.083
(0.05) (0.00) (0.122)
Maputo~ Mocuba 0.lE-02 O.lE-02 0.998
(0.00 8 ) (0.00 I) (0.00 I) ,~~
it-
Pemba ~ Maputo 0.043 0.lE-02 0.956
(0.2541 ) (0.00 8) (0.00 I)
•
Maputo ~ Xai-Xai 0.lE-02 0.658 0.341
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) ~
......
\
Nampula ~ Beira 0.lE-02 O.lE-02 0.998
(0.00 8 ) (0.00 8 ) (0.00 I) ~
: .
,
Nampula ~ Tete 0.lE-02 0.IE-02 0.998 1(0.00 8) (0.00 I) (0.00 ") ....
Chimoio ~ Mocuba 0.302 0.413 0.556
(0.63) (0.00) (0.00)
Tete ~ Maputo 0.449 0.698 0.283
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) , I
Tete ~ Beira 0.019 0.733 0.266
(0.928) (0.00) (0.00)
Chimoio ~ Beira 0.835 0.1E-02 0.163(0.00) (0.016) (0.275)
Maputo ~ Maxixe 0.641 0.1E-02 0.358
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Nampula ~ Maxixe 0.090 0.034 0.876
(0.01) (0.12) (0.00)
Notes: Regime I, II, and III are defined respectively when price spreads equal, fall below, and equal
transfer cost. P-values are in parentheses. Superscript a indicates that parameter estimates and p-values may
not be valid since the edge of the parameter space was encountered.
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Mocuba and Chimoio) except for the pair Mocuba-Chimoio that is efficient only 44 % of
the time. Results also indicate that spatial arbitrage between southern and central
Mozambique is efficient 50 % to 92 % of the time, but price spreads between maize
markets in northern Mozambique and those in central/southern Mozambique are less than
or equal to transportation costs less than 15 % of the time. These results suggest that
maize markets in the northern region function in relative isolation. As expected, when
diesel prices are used as a deflator of transportation cost observations, there is an average
decrease of 18% in arbitrage inefficiency (see table 5.2). However, results are consistent.
Li and Barrett, and Barrett argue that spatial trade is best measured by interregional
shipments rather than price-cost based indicators. Records of interregional maize flows in
Mozambique (see table 5.3) agree with the PBM results discussed above. Consistent with
the PBM results, table 5.3 indicates that there are flows of maize within and between
south/central Mozambique, but no records of maize flows from northern Mozambique to
central/southern regions. While it is likely that some maize is shipped from northern
surplus regions to central/southern regions, the average frequency of shipments is
expected to be low. Together, the PBM estimates and interregional maize shipments
suggest that the probability ofmarket integration between southern and central
Mozambique is higher than between northern Mozambique and central/southern
Mozambique. Recall that northern Mozambique is a maize surplus (even during regional
droughts) and southern Mozambique is perpetually a maize deficit region (Jayne et al.).
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Table 5.2. Estimates of the PBM Regime Probabilities for Mozambique Maize Retail
Markets Using Diesel Prices as a Deflator to Project Transfer Costs.
Probabilities
Maize Route Regime I Regime II Regime III
Chimoio ~ Xai-Xai 0.774 0.IE-02 0.225
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Maputo ~ Beira 0.456 0.175 0.368
(0.08) (0.39) (0.00)
Chimoio ~ Maputo 0.1 E-02 0.938 0.061
(0.00) (0.00) (0.189)
Maputo ~ Mocuba 0.IE-02 0.1£-02 0.997
"
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) '.)
, ".
0.999
,;--
Pemba ~ Maputo 0.1 E-02 0.IE-02 l~.
(0.00 3 ) (0.00 3 ) (O.OOa) I,I:
Maputo~ Xai-Xai 0.IE-02 0.818 O. I81 I.
(0.13) (0.00) (0.01) ;:>
'.I,
Nampula ~ Beira 0.1£-02 0.1£-02 0.998
I"
I,
(O.OOa) (0.00 3 ) (0.00 a) '.
!,'
Nampula ~ Tete ' ..0.1£-02 0.IE-02 0.998 1i
(0.00 a) (0.00 a) (0.00 a) II~ I
I;:
Chimoio ~ Mocuba 0.5£-02 0.500 0.494
(0.00) (0.39) (0.00) .~1,:
"Tete ~ Maputo 0.3E-02 0.617 0.379 ItII(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 1....
I
Tete ~ Beira 0.029 0.805 0.167
(0.91 ) (0.00) (0.02)
Chimoio ~ Beira 0.835 O. IE-02 0.163(0.00) (0.016) (0.275)
Maputo ~ Maxixe 0.IE-02 0.699 0.299
(0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Nampula ~ Maxixe 0.353 0.1E-02 0.646
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: Regime I, II, and III are defined respectively when price spreads equal, fall below, and equal
transfer cost. P-values are in parentheses. Superscript a indicates that parameter estimates and p-values may
not be valid since the edge of the parameter space was encountered.
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Table 5.3 Recorded Interregional Maize Flows in Mozambique (1998-2001).
Percent of Destination Market
Exporting Market Maputo Inhambane Sofala Manica Zambezia Nampula
Maputo 14.17
Gaza (Chocke) 25.25 7.17
Maxixe 0.84 17.29
Sofala (Beira) 5.36 17.25
Manica (Chimoio) 36.61 59.26 34.73 86.14
Tete 11.78 0.41 9.32 1.14
Zambezia (Mocuba) 2.52 4.35 98.71 90
Nampu1a 6
Pemba
Lichinga
Others 8.42 6.16 39 12.71 1.29 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: Author's computations based on data from the SIMA database.
The PBM estimates are also consistent with access to roads in Mozambique. The road
that would connect northern with central/southern Mozambique stops at Caia in the
border the between the SofaJa (Beira) and Zambezia (Mocuba) provinces (see figure
2.2). The ferryboat crossing the Zambezi River until Zambezia province is not always
available and there is no railway connecting northern with southern Mozambique
The possibility of maritime transportation is limited by obsolete/inefficient tertiary and
secondary ports (DNCI, No. 18). Very often, road connection with northern Mozambique
is made through Malawi, especially during the rainy season (DNCI, No. 18). Despite
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poor roads (about 53% ofthe roads in Mozambique are feeder roads), maize is primarily
transported by truck. Poor access to roads appears to be limiting trade between southern
(maize deficit) and northern (maize surplus) Mozambique.
The inefficiency of spatial arbitrage, as measured by regime III probabilities, is high
when compared to the results obtained for rice markets in the Philippines by Baulch, and
those obtained by Li and Barrett while studying soybean meal trade between the United
States, Canada, Japan and Taiwan. These studies used switching regressions similar to
the one used here.
5.3 Maize Price Dynamics
The results of the ADF and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test on maize price logarithms
are presented in table 5.4. The ADF test indicates that the null hypothesis of a Wlit root
cannot be rejected for Chokwe, Nampula, Pemba, and Lichinga prices. With the PP test,
however, the null hypothesis is rejected for all but Lichinga. Note that Lichinga has the
largest number of missing values (l07). Given that unit root tests have low power
(Maddala and Kim) with small samples (none of the unit root tests are uniformly more
powerful than the others), and there is no reason to believe that Lichinga prices are
structurally different from the others, all maize prices are treated as if they were
stationary. Following the procedure presented in figure 4.3, a VAR is used to model
maize price dynamics and measure the lead-lag relationships between spatial maize
prices.
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Table 5.4. Unit Root Test Statistics on Weekly Maize Prices (MeticaislKilogram)
ofMozambique, 1994-2001.
ADF Test Statistic Phillips-Perron Test Statistic
with a Linear with a Drift with a Linear with a Drift
Market Trend and Drift Only Trend and Drift Only
Maputo -3.44* -3.68* 3.95* -4.05*
Chokwe -2.77 -2.64 -2.95 -2.87·
Maxixe -3.66'" -3.74* -3.48* -3.58*
Beira -4.09'" -4.13* -3.98* -4.05·
Chimoio -4.08* -4.20* -3.65* -3.81*
Tete -3.06 -3.13* -3.32 -3.39*
Mocuba -3.67* -3.72* -3.28 -3.44*
Nampula -2.61 -2.73 -2.84 -2.91 ...
Pemba -2.89 -2.79 -4.26* -4.15*
Lichinga -2.06 -1.83 -2.46 -2.54
Notes: An asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level. Asymptotic critical value for ADF unit root test
with drift and trend is -3.41 at 5 % level. The critical value for ADF unit root test with a drift is -2.86 at 5%
level of significance.
To be consistent with the PBM resu.ts, access to roads, and maize shipments reported in
table 5.3, two VAR systems are estimated. The first system includes maize markets in
southern/central Mozambique that are connected by roads (see figure 2.2) and have inter-
market maize shipments (see table 5.3). The second VAR includes maize markets in
northern Mozambique (Mocuba, Nampula, Niassa and Pemba). These markets are not
connected by roads with central/southern Mozambique, and there are little or no records
of maize shipments from these regions to central/southern Mozambique.. Further, except
for Mocuba, spatial arbitrage between northern and central Mozambique is inefficient 85
% of the time.
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The lag lengths of the VAR equations estimated by the BIC+2 procedure are provided in
table 5.5. As table 5.5 shows, univariate lag selection yielded different lag lengths.
Markets in central Mozambique (Tete, Beira and Chimoio) have the lowest lag lengths,
suggesting that they have higher speed of price adjustment when compared northern and
southern Mozambique. For both VAR equations, multivariate lag length was limited to a
maximum of seven to avoid shortages of degrees of freedom due to missing values.
Multivariate lag estimation also yielded different lag lengths.
Table 5.5. Estimated Lag Length for Weekly Maize Prices (MeticaislKilogram) for the
period 1994 - 2001 Using the BIC+2 Procedure
....
.~
Lag Order :)
"
Dependent When Only the Dependent Lag Length of the Remaining
.~
Variable Variable is Considered Regressors in the System
....
Maputo 4 4
.:
Chokwe 5 4 ....
to:
Maxixe 4 3 I
I
Beira 3 4 "-
Chimoio 3 4
Tete 3 3
Mocuba 6 3
Nampula 5 4
Pemba 4 3
Lichinga 3 6
Note: The variables included in each equation depend upon which trading region is considered. The first VAR includes
Maputo, Xai-Xai, Maxixe, Beira, Chimoio, and Tete. The second VAR includes Mocuba, Nampula, Pemba, and
Lichinga.
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Joint misspecification tests on the residuals of the VAR of central/southern Mozambique
are provided in table 5.6. The joint LM autocorrelation test indicated mild autocorrelation
that was corrected by adding one more lag for Chimoio and Beira maize prices. The joint
RESET test failed to reject the null hypothesis of linear equations against an alternative
hypothesis of quadratic specification. Given the joint ARCH test could not reject the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity of the residuals, these were treated as if they were white
nOise.
Table 5.6. Summary F-Statistics of Misspecification Tests on the Residuals of the
VAR for Central and Southern Mozambique.
....
LM test for autocorrelation 1.36
(0.23)
Misspecification Test
Joint test for seasonality
Joint Reset2 test
Joint ARCH test
Joint F-Statistic
2.08*
(0.00)
1.30
(0.26)
1.25
(0.28)
:~
....
.:
'..
.,:
"- f
Note: The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Asterisk indicates significance at the 5 % level. The
markets included in the VAR are (Maputo, Chokwe, Maxixe, Chimoio, Beira, and Tete
Misspecification tests on the residuals of the VAR of northern Mozambique are provided
in table 5.7. As table 5.7 indicates, while the joint LM autocorrelation test indicates that
does not reject the null hypothesis of independent residuals, the joint ARCH test rejected
the joint null of homoskedasticity. Further testing indicated that the source of
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Table 5.7. Summary F-Statistics of Misspecification Tests on the Residuals of the
VAR for Northern Mozambique
Misspecification Test
Joint test for seasonality
Joint Reset2 test
Joint ARCH test
Joint F-Statistic
3.47....
(0.00)
1.39
(0.240
6.62**
(0.00)
LM test for autocorrelation 1.12
(0.34)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Asterisk indicates significance at the 5 % level. The
markets included in the VAR are Mocuba, Nampula, Pemba, and Lichinga.
heteroskedasticity was Nampula. Since the Kolmogorov-Smirnov nonparametric test for
nonnality did not reject the null ofnonnally distributed residuals for Nampula, and the
correction for heteroskedasticity is impractical (in a SUR) with missing values, no
correction for heteroskedasticity is made. Caution is necessary when interpreting the
results of the Granger causality tests for northern Mozambique, since the estimator may
not be efficient. The joint RESET test failed to reject the null hypothesis of linear
equations against an alternative hypothesis of a quadratic specification.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test (see tables 5.8 and 5.9) indicates that the null
hypothesis of normally distributed residuals is rejected at 5 % level for nearly all
equations in the VAR for both southern/central and northern Mozambique. Given that the
variance is homoskedastic, hypothesis tests using t-tests and F-tests are still carried out
appealing to the central limit theorem. However, these tests may lack power.
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Table 5.8. Summary F-statistics of Causality Tests between Retail Maize Prices in
Central and Southern Mozambique.
Lagged Independent Variable Koimogorov-
Dependent Smimov
Variable Maputo Chokwe Maxixe Beira Chimoio Tete Normality test
Maputo 0.96 0.64 0.30 0.63 0.76 0.18 0.09**
(0.43) (0.63) (0.88) (0.64) (0.55) (0.95) (0.02)
Chokwe 0.34 30.22** 0.92 1.22 2.35"'* 1.16 0.16**
(0.85) (0.00) (0.49) (0.30) (0.05) (0.33) (0.01 )
Maxixe 0.68 1.19 7.66** 0.61 1.46 0.62 0.15** )
(0.57) (0.31 ) (0.00) (0.61) (0.22) (0.60) (0.01) ...
Chimoio 0.22 0.93 1.60 0.13 11.30** 3.38** 0.09*
(0.93) (0.45) (0.17) (0.97) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07)
Beira 1.38 1.13 2.08* 5.28** 1.41 2.07* 0.13++
(0.24) (0.34) (0.08) (0.00) (0.23) (0.09) (0.01)
Tete 1.14 1.33 0.64 1.61 1.13 5.16** 0.06
(0.33) (0.27) (0.59) (0.19) (0.34) (0.00) (0.15)
:
Notes: p-values are in parentheses. Two asterisks indicate significance at 5 % level and one asterisk
indicates significance at 10 % level. The Variables included in the VAR are Maputo, Chokwe, Maxixe, ..:
Tete, Chimoio and Beira.
,
-
Misspecification tests indicated that both VARs are adequate to conduct causality tests.
The results of multivariate Granger causality between spatial maize prices in
Mozambique are presented in tables 5.8 and 5.9. Contrary to what was found in the U.S.
markets (Brorsen, Chavas and Grant; Schroeder and Goodwin), the joint F-test indicates
that Maputo, the largest retail market in Mozambique, does not lead maize prices in
south/central Mozambique. Chokwe prices follow Chimoio prices, and Maxixe leads
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Table 5.9. Summary F-statistics for Causality Tests on Retail Maize Prices of Northem
Mozambique
Lagged Independent Variable Kolrnogorov-
Dependent Smimov
Variable Mocuba Nampula Pemba Lichinga Nonnality test
Mocuba 11.50** 1.07 0.74 0.59 0.08*
(0.00) (0.36) (0.53) (0.62) (0.09)
Nampula 7.68*'" 16.64** 0.95 3.25** 0.06**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.02) (0.15)
Pemba 1.12 2.77** 6.00** 1.18 0.08*
(0.34) (0.04) (0.00) (0.32) (0.07) ~
..
Lichinga 0.23 1.19 1.27 36.67** 0.06*
(0.97) (0.31) (0.27) (0.00) (0.15)
Note: p-values are in parentheses. Two asterisks indicate significance at 5 % level and one asterisk )
indicates significance at 10 % level. The variables included in the VAR are Mocuba, Nampula, Pemba,
Lichinga.
Beira. Maxixe is closer to the central region than Maputo and Chokwe. Recall that there
are road connections between southern and central Mozambique and there are records of
maize shipments from central and southern Mozambique (see table 5.3).
The lack of Maputo's dominance in the price discovery process in southern/central
Mozambique may be due to arbitrage inefficiency or to its closeness to South Africa,
which is a bigger market than Maputo. There are good roads between Maputo and
Randfontein (South Africa), and there are reports of strong fonnal and informal maize
and maize meal imports from South Africa to Maputo (Macamo). The PBM estimates
indicate that the arbitrage efficiency between Maputo and Randfontein (90 %) is higher
than other markets within Mozambique, except Chimoio (see appendix c).
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In central Mozambique, Tete emerges as the price leader. Tete maize prices lead Beira
and Chimoio pri.ces, and Chimoio prices lead Cbokwe price. Hence, Tete indirectly
Granger causes Chokwe maize prices througb Cbimoio. Tete, located in central
Mozambique, has good road links with other provinces in central Mozambique and
exports maize to Malawi and Zambia (DNCI, No.3). Beira, located in the heart of the
Beira Corridor (a 100 km wide international trade channel linking Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi and South Africa to the port of Beira on the Indian
ocean), was expected to lead the price discovery process in central Mozambique.
In northern Mozambique (see table 5.9), Mocuba and Lichinga lead Nampula prices,
which in tum lead Pemba. None of these markets clearly dominates the others in the
maize price discovery process. Like Maputo and Beira in southern and central
Mozambique respectively, Nampula is considered the main maize retail market in
northern Mozambique, and was expected to lead the price discovery process in the
northern region.
Results also indicate that maize prices in Mozambique (refer to tables 5.6 and 5.7) follow
seasonal cycles suggesting that storage is not free. Arndt et a1. argue that storage costs in
rural or near rural areas is higher than in urban areas where previous maize monopolies
have about 235,000 of usable storage capacity. All maize markets in Mozambique
areresponsive to past prices within one to six weeks. These lag lags are similar to the lags
found by Schroeder and Goodwin, and by Baulch. Schroeder and Goodwin fOWld that
slaughter steers prices in the U.S. cattle industry have lagged price responses between
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two and three weeks. Baulch found lags between one and two months in the Philippines
rice industry. Lagged price responses in Mozambique are consistent with poor roads and
lack of access to market infonnation faced by market agents in the maize marketing
channel.
5.4 Summary
The results of the tests for spatial arbitrage efficiency and lead-lag relationships between
spatial maize prices were presented in this chapter. The test for spatial arbitrage
efficiency used both CPI and diesel prices to deflate transportation cost. Although the
PBM estimates are slightly higher when diesel prices are used as a deflator, results are
consistent. The PBM estimates indicate that arbitrage is efficient 85 % of the time within
central Mozambique (85%), and 66% in southern Mozambique (66%). The probability of
efficient spatial arbitrage between central and southern Mozambique varies between 50 to
92 %, and spatial arbitrage between northern (maize surplus) Mozambique and other
regions is inefficient 85 % of the time. Existing records of interregional maize shipments
are consistent with the PBM estimates in that there are shipments of maize between
central and southern Mozambique, and few between northern Mozambique and
central/southern Mozambique. Hence, markets in southern and central Mozambique are
integrated with each other, but not with markets in northern Mozambique.
Granger causality tests indicated that none of the markets in southern Mozambique
dominates the others in the maize price discovery process. Only Maxixe appears to
anticipate maize prices in central Mozambique, particularly Beira. Maxixe is closer to
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central Mozambique than Maputo and Chokwe. In central Mozambique, Tete appears to
lead the price discovery process, and in northern Mozambique there is no clear price
leader. The distance from producing areas appears to be more important in spatial price
transmission than the size of the market. 'This is not surprising given the quality of roads
in Mozambique. In general, both PBM and Granger causality tests suggest that maize
markets in southern/central Mozambique have trade links but spatial arbitrage remains
inefficient.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Research Problem, Objectives, Methods and Conclusions
More than a decade has passed since Mozambique refonned food crop markets and
liberalized maize prices. Yet, price instabilities and maize shortages are still puzzling the
population and the government. This study maintains that the persisting problem of maize
spatial arbitrage inefficiency is a possible explanation of why food shortages and price
instability continue to be a problem in Mozambique despite market liberalization.
When spatial trade efficient, food shortages in deficit regions are transmitted to surplus
regions via prices, and arbitrage triggers flows of food across space. Consumers from
deficit regions pay lower food prices and producers from surplus regions receive higher
prices and, therefore, have an incentive to increase production. Through efficient spatial
arbitrage, the risk of crop failure in some regions is shared over a large market area and,
prices are more stable. This study aimed to measure the efficiency of spatial trade in
Mozambique.
Maize trading in Mozambique is dominated by infonnal traders who transact small
quantities of maize depending upon their own capital. Maize is inspected and paid upon
delivery. Usually, cash payments are made without invoicing, a practice that complicates
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accounting. Lack of accounting further limits the possibility of getting a loan from fonnal
lending institutions. Fonnallending institutions serve less than 20 % of the Mozambican
population (Larson). Maize transported on trucks, and maize transportation costs are the
largest portion ofmaize transfer costs. Access to roads and credit appear to be the most
important constraints faced by traders. There is no road connection between maize
surplus regions (mainly northern Mozambique) and southern maize deficit regions, and
most roads are impassable during the rainy season.
To accomplish the objectives of this study, two complementary procedures were used.
The Baulch's switching regression (PBM) is used to measure spatial arbitrage efficiency,
and time-series models used to detennine lead-lag relationships between spatial maize
prices and provide further information about spatial price transmission and the relevant
maize market area. The PBM is a switching regression that combines maize prices and
interregional shipping costs, and accounts for nonstationary transfer costs and trade
discontinuities that often cause inferential problems on models that use only prices to test
for market efficiency and integration. Time series models are used to model maize price
dynamics.
Spatial arbitrage efficiency tests indicated that maize markets in central Mozambique
have the highest probability of being efficient (85%), followed by markets in southern
Mozambique (66%). Spatial arbitrage between central and southern Mozambique is
efficient 50 to 92% of the time. But arbitrage conditions between northern Mozambique
and other regions are violated 85% of the time indicating that it would pay to ship maize
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from the north to the south. Yet, records of interregional maize shipments show that grain
is not being shipped from northern to southern Mozambique. Access to roads and
distance between markets appear to be more important in spatial arbitrage and maize
price transmission than the size of the market.
Results indicate that a decade after food market liberalization, spatial maize arbitrage
remains inefficient in much of Mozambique. While market reforms have undoubtedly
helped, inefficient spatial arbitrage limits the benefits obtained from freeing markets.
Under these circumstances, reports of food shortages and price instability are likely to
continue.
Poor roads and trader's lack of access to capital are possible explanations of spatial trade
inefficiency. Most roads have seasonal circulation limiting interregional maize
shipments. Interest rates are high for most maize traders. High interest rates force traders
to transact small quantities of maize resulting in high per-unit transaction costs. The end
result is unexploited arbitrage opportunities and inefficiency.
While specific policy recommendations can hardly be drawn directly from the results of
this study, non-price policies could enhance spatial efficiency. Policy interventions
should be directed to (i) reduce transaction risks and Oi) reduce marketing costs.
Transaction risks in maize trading contribute to rudimentary business practices. Maize is
inspected and paid upon delivery. Cash payments are made without invoicing, a practice
that complicate accounting. The lack of accounting skills by borrowers and small scale of
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operation results in low probability of loan repayment and, hence, high interest rates.
Poor roads raise trader's costs, limit access to local markets, and discourage trade.
Investment in roads (particularly north-south roads) and, perhaps, lowering the costs of
licensed traders would help reduce food shortages and price instabilities.
6.2 Study Limitations
There are three limitations of the PBM that are worth mentioning. First, the quality of the
PBM estimates used to make inferences about spatial arbitrage efficiency depend largely
on the quality of transfer cost observations used to extrapolate times series cost data. If
transfer costs are overstated, functionally isolated markets may be deemed efficient. On
the other hand, if transfer costs are underestimated, well functioning markets may be
found functionally inefficient. Monte Carlo studies have shown that when transfer cost
data are overstated or understated by more than 12.5 %, the PBM fails to converge or
parameter estimates reach the edge of the parameter space (Baulch). In this study there
were no cases when convergence was not achieved and there were only four cases when
the edge of parameter estimates was encountered (see table 5.1 and 5.2). Further, single
point transport costs reported by Coulter (1995) and by DNCI (No.3, 1998) have the
same magnitude when compared with corresponding points of the extrapolated series
suggesting that the extrapolated cost data are acceptable.
Second, while the PBM detects violation of spatial arbitrage conditions that indicate
inefficiency, it does not identify the reasons that lead to such violations. Spatial arbitrage
inefficiency may indicate that some market controls still exist, or that there are
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-institutional constraints (i.e. lack of information or credit), or that transportation
infrastructure is inadequate, or both.
Third, the assumptions of independence between transfer cost data and maize prices, and
of half-normal error terms are questionable. While the specification of the PBM
likelihood function as a mixture of distributions is a flexible way of modeling unknown
probability distributions (Baulch), there is no prior justification why the two error terms
should be truncated. However, Monte Carlo studies indicate that the half-normality
asswnption does not cause considerable bias of the PBM estimates (Baulch).
With regard to the dynamic time series model used to detennine the lead-lag relationships
between spatial maize prices, two weakness need to be pointed out. First, the
specification of a linear model is somehow inconsistent with trade discontinuities
between spatial markets. However, the misspecification tests (RESET-test) failed to
reject the hypothesis of a linear model in favor of a quadratic specification.
Finally, the restriction of the VAR equations lag length to a maximum of five lags was
ad-hoc, and intended to avoid excessive loss of degrees of freedom due to missing values.
With such a restriction and lack of prior information on price adjustments, it is possible
that the lag lengths selected by BIC+2 procedure are different from the "true" lag.
However, the LM test of no autocorrelation failed to reject the null, indicating that no
significant bias was introduced by such ad-hoc procedures.
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6.3 Suggestion for Future Research
The model used to measure spatial arbitrage efficiency can detect violations ofspatial
arbitrage conditions but it does not identify the causes of such violations. Further studies
need to measure the effect of institutional constraints (e.g. access to roads, credit and
infonnation) on spatial price arbitrage, so that specific policy recommendations could be
drawn. For example, given precise infonnation about beginning/ending of road
construction on a given maize route, one could measure the welfare gains from road
improvement by examining maize marketing margins before and after road improvement.
•
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APPENDIX A
TbePBM Code
The PBM code used to estimate the efficiency of spatial arbitrage is provided in this
section. The code uses TSP 4.4. Three sets of starting values were used in the PBM
estimation. The PBM estimates reported are those with the highest likelihood value. The
averages of the PBM estimates are presented in annex B.
OPTIONS CRT,LIMWARN=O,LIMERR=10000,LIMNUM=2000;
?************************************************.*********.***********
? Purpose: Msc Thesis
? Date: 11/14/01
?
? Switching regresion with 3 regimes
? Regime 1: Y=pl-p2=C : Yt=Ct+Et
? Regime 2: Y=pl-p2<K : Yt=Ct+Et-Ut
? Regime 3: Y=pl-p2>K : Yt=Ct+Et+Vt
?***********************************************************************
read(file ='c:\tostao\chi_Bei.xls') chi_bei chi bei;
? get some descriptive statistics to verify the data
msd chi bei chi_bei;
? define the regimes and the ML estimator
b=log(chi_bei); y=log(abs(chi-bei»);
?likelihood function
FRML RLI Ll=0.OOI+(0.999-0.001)*CNORM(LAMl);
FRML RL2 L2=0.OOI +0-(0.001+(0.999-0.001 )*CNORM(LAM1»
-0.001)* CNORM(LAM2);
FRML RL3 L3=1-(0.001+(0.999-0.001)*CNORM(LAM1»
-(0.001 +(1-(0.001 +(0.999-0.00 1)*CNORM(LAM1»-0.001)
*CNORM(LAM2»;
FRML LOGLEQ LOGL=LOG(LI *Fl +L2*F2+L3*F3);
FRML REGIMEI Fl=(1/SQRT(SIGV**2))*NORM«Y-B)
/SQRT(SIGV**2»;
FRML REGIME3 F3=(2/(SQRT(SIGUI **2+SIGV*"'2»)
*NORM«Y-B)/SQRT(SIGUI **2+SIGV**2))
*( l-CNORM«(Y-B)*(SQRT(SIGUI **2)/SQRT(SIGV**2»)
/SQRT(SIGU 1**2+SIGV**2»));
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FRML REGIME2 F2=(2/(SQRT(SIGU2**2+SIGV**2»)
*NORM«(Y-B»/SQRT(SIGU2**2+SIGV**2»
*(l-CNORM«-(Y-B)*(SQRT(SIGU2**2)1SQRT(SIGV**2)))
ISQRT(SIGU2**2+SIGV**2)));
? Substitute constituents parts into likelihood function
EQSUB LOGLEQ RLI RL2 RL3 REGlME1 REGIME2 REGIME3;
? Set starting values for sigu1, sigu2,sigv,laml and lam2
SET SIGU1=1;
SET SIGU2=2;
SET SIGV=0.79;
SET LAMl=1.3;
SET LAM2=0.7;
PARAM SIGUl,SIGU2,SIGV,LAMI,LAM2;
? Perfonn maximum likelihood estimation
ML(HITER=D,HCOV=D,MAXIT=200,TOL=0.01) LOGLEQ;
SETN=@NOB;
? Use Gallant-Holly method to compute standard errors and
? T-statistics of the unconstrained regime probabilities
ANALYZ(NOPRINT) RL 1;
SET TPROB 1=@TA;
ANALYZ(NOPRINT) RL2;
SET TPROB2=@TA;
ANALYZ(NOPRINT) RL3;
SET TPROB3=@TA;
? Check whether ML routine converged
SMPL 1,89;
IF@LOGL=O;
THEN;
CONVl=O;
ELSE;
CONVl=@IFCONV;
IF CONVl=l;
THEN;
DO;
CONV2=-1;
? If convergence achieved, compute unconstrained "lambdas"
SET Ll=O.OOl +(0.999-0.00l)*CNORM(LAMI);
SET L2=0.00 1+(1-(0.00 1+(0.999-0.001 )*CNORM(LAM 1»
-0.001 )*CNORM(LAM2);
SET L3=I-(0.001+(0.999-0.00l)*CNORM(LAMI»
-(0.001 +( 1-(0.001+(0.999-0.001 )*CNORM(LAMl»
-0.001 )*CNORM(LAM2»;
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? Saved uncontrained vs if they are significant at 5% level
IF ABS(TPROB1»1.96;
THEN;
PROBREG1=Ll;
ELSE;
PROBREG1=9.999;
IF ABS(TPROB2» 1.96;
THEN;
PROBREG2=L2;
ELSE;
PROBREG2=9.999;
IF ABS(TPROB3» 1.96;
THEN;
PROBREG3=L3;
ELSE;
PROBREG3=9.999;
PRINT PROBREG 1 PROBREG2 PROBREG3;
? PBM with second set of starting values
FRML RL12 LI2=0.001 +(0.999-0.001)*CNORM(LAM1);
FRML RL22 L22=0.00l+(1-(0.001+(0.999-0.001)*CNORM(LAM1»
-0.00 I )*CNORM(LAM2);
FRML RL32 L32=1-(0.00l+(0.999-0.00I)*CNORM(LAM1»
-(0.001 +(1-(0.00] +(0.999-0.001 )*CNORM(LAM I»-0.001)
*CNORM(LAM2»;
FRML LOGLEQ2 LOGL=LOG(LI2*FI2+L22*F22+L32*F32);
FRML REG1ME12 F12=(IISQRT(SIGV**2»*NORM«Y-B)
/SQRT(SIGV**2»;
FRML REGIME32 F32=(2/(SQRT(SIGUl **2+SIGV**2»)
*NORM«Y-B)/SQRT(SIGUI **2+SIGV**2»
*(l-CNORM«(Y-B)*(SQRT(S1GUl **2)/SQRT(SIGV* *2»)
/SQRT(SIGUI **2+SIGV**2»);
FRML REGIME22 F22=(2/(SQRT(SIGU2**2+SIGV**2»)
*NORM«(Y-B»/SQRT(SIGU2**2+S1GV**2»
*(l-CNORM« -(V-B)*(SQRT(SIGU2**2)/SQRT(SIGV* *2»)
/SQRT(SIGU2**2+SIGV**2»);
? Substitute constituents parts into likelihood function
EQSUB LOGLEQ2 RL12 RL22 RL32 REGIME12 REGIME22 REGIME32;
? Set starting values for sigu I , sigu2,sigv,lam1 and lam2
SET S1GU1=1.];
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SET SIGU2=2.15;
SET SIGV=1.1;
SET LAMl=2.2;
SET LAM2=0.7;
PARAM SIGUl,SIGU2,SIGV,LAMI,LAM2;
ML(HITER=D,HCOV=D,MAXIT=200,TOL=0.01) LOGLEQ2;
SETN=@NOB;
ANALYZ(NOPRINT) RL12;
SET TPROB 11 =@TA;
ANALYZ(NOPRINT) RL22;
SET TPROB22=@TA;
ANALYZ(NOPRINT) RL32;
SET TPROB33=@TA;
IF ABS(TPROB II» 1.96;
THEN;
PROBREGll=LI2;
ELSE;
PROBREGI2=9.999;
IF ABS(TPROB22» 1.96;
THEN;
PROBREG22=L22;
ELSE;
PROBREG22=9.999;
IF ABS(TPROB33» 1.96;
THEN;
PROBREG32=L32;
ELSE;
PROBREG32=9.999;
? PRINT PROBREG 11 PROBREG22 PROBREG33;
? If convergence achieved, compute unconstrained "lambdas"
SET LI2=0.001 +(0.999-0.001)*CNORM(LAM 1);
SET L22=0.001 +(1-(0.001 +(0.999-0.001 )*CNORM(LAMl»
-0.001 )*CNORM(LAM2);
SET L32=1-(0.001 +(0.999-0.001)*CNORM(LAMl»
-(0.001 +(1-(0.001 +(0.999-0.001 )*CNORM(LAMl»
-0.OOI)*CNORM(LAM2»;
? Third second set of starting values for sigul, sigu2,sigv,lam I and lam2
FRML RL13 LI3=0.OOI+(0.999-0.001)*CNORM(LAMl);
FRML RL23 L23=0.001+( 1-(0.001+(0.999-0.001 )*CNORM(LAM 1»
-0.001 )*CNORM(LAM2);
FRML RL33 L33=1-(0.001 +(0.999-0.001)*CNORM(LAMl»
-(0.001 +(1-(0.00 I+(0.999-0.001 )*CNORM(LAMl»-O.OOI)
*CNORM(LAM2»;
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FRML LOGLEQ3 LOGL=LOG(Ll3*F13+L23*F23+L33*F33)~
FRML REGIMEl3 F13=(l/SQRT(SIGV**2»*NORM«Y-B)
/SQRT(SIGV**2»;
FRML REGIME33 F33=(2/(SQRT(SIGUl"2+SIGV**2»)
*NORM«Y-B)/SQRT(SIGUl **2+SIGV"2»
*(l-CNORM«(Y-B)*(SQRT(SIGUI **2)/SQRT(SIGV**2»)
/SQRT(SIGUl **2+SIGV**2»);
FRML REGIME23 F23=(2/(SQRT(SIGU2**2+SIGV**2»)
*NORM«(Y-B»/SQRT(SIGU2**2+SIGV**2»
*(l-CNORM« -(V-B)*(SQRT(SIGU2* *2)/SQRT(SIGV**2»)
/SQRT(SIGU2· *2+SIGV· ·2»)~
? Substitute constituents parts into likelihood function
EQSUB LOGLEQ3 RL13 RL23 RL33 REGIMEl3 REGIME23 REGIME33;
SET SIGU1=1;
SET SIGU2=2;
SET SIGV=l~
SET LAM1=2;
SET LAM2=O.65;
PARAM SIGU1,SIGU2,SIGV,LAM1,LAM2;
ML(HITER=D,HCOV=D,MAXIT=100,TOL=O.OI) LOGLEQ3~
SETN=@NOB~
ANALYZ(NOPRINT) RLI3;
SET TPROB 11 =@TA;
ANALYZ(NOPRINT) RL23;
SET TPROB22=@TA;
ANALYZ(NOPRINT) RL33;
SFT TPROB33=@TA;
IF ABS(TPROB11» 1.96;
THEN;
PROBREGll=LI3;
ELSE;
PROBREGll=9.999;
IF ABS(TPROB22» 1.96;
THEN;
PROBREG22=L23;
ELSE;
PROBREG22=9.999;
IF ABS(TPROB33» 1.96;
THEN;
PROBREG33=L33;
ELSE;
PROBREG33=9.999;
? PRINT PROBREG 13 PROBREG23 PROBREG33;
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SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES
Table A. 1. Average Estimates of the PBM Regime Probabilities for Mozambique Maize
Retail Markets Using CPI as a Deflator to Project Transfer Costs.
PBM Regime Probabilities
Maize Route Regime 1 Regime II Regime III
Chimoio ~ Xai-Xai 0.209 0.2286 0.505
Maputo ~ Beira 0.491 0.lE-02 0.507
Chimoio~ Maputo 0.lE-02 0.943 0.055
Maputo ~ Mocuba 0.666 a 0.lE-02 a 0.333 a
Pem ba ~ Maputo 0.015 a 0.IE-02 a 0.977 a
Maputo ~ Xai-Xai 0.1 E-02 0.658 0.341
Nampula ~ Beira 0.lE-02 a 0.1 E-02 a 0.998 a
Nampula ~ Tete O.IE-02" 0.1 E-02" 0.998 B
Chimoio ~ Mocuba 0.208 0.286 0.505
Tete ~ Maputo 0.45 0.001 0.549
Tete ~ Beira 0.265 0.489 0.246
Chimoio ~ Beira 0.832 O.2E-02 0.164
Maputo ~ Maxixe 0.637 0.1 E-02 0.361
Nampula ~ Maxixe 0.094 0.012 0.893
Notes: Regime I, II. and III are defined respectively when price spreads equal, fall below, and equal
transfer cost. Superscript a indicates that parameter estimates may not be valid since the edge of the
parameter space was encountered. The figures are averages ofPBM estimates with three different sets of
starting values.
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Table A. 2. Average Estimates of the PBM Regime Probabilities for Mozambique Maize
Retail Markets Using Diesel Prices as a Deflator to Project Transfer Costs.
PBM Regime Probabilities
Maize Route Regime I Regime II Regime III
Chimoio ~ Xai-Xai 0.512 0.209 0.274
Maputo ~ Beira 0.611 0.059 0.329
Chimoio ~ Maputo 0.IE-02 0.958 0.041
Maputo ~ Mocuba 0.006 a 0.1 E-02" 0.993 "
Pemba~ Maputo 0.334 a 0.lE-02 a 0.665 "
Maputo ~ Xai-Xai 0.IE-02 0.817 0.182
Nampula ~ Beira 0.666 a 0.lE-02 a 0.333 a
Nampula ~ Tete 0.IE-02" 0.1E-02 " 0.998 "
Chimoio ~ Mocuba 0.006 0.499 0.499
Tete ~ Maputo 0.500 0.309 0.189
Tete ~ Beira 0.607 0.281 0.111
Chimoio ~ Beira 0.832 0.2E-02 0.164
Maputo ~ Maxixe 0.263 0.467 0.27
NampuJa ~ Maxixe 0.353 0.001 0.646
Notes: Regime I, II, and III are defined respectively when price spreads equal, fall below, and equal
transfer cost. Superscript a indicates that parameter estimates may not be valid since the edge of the
parameter space was encountered. The figures are averages of PBM estimates with three different sets of
starting values.
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APPENDIXC
AN OVERVIEW OF MAIZE TRADE BETWEEN
MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA
Most countries in the SA region have liberalized their food markets, and made regional
trade agreements promoting free trade. Mozambique and South Africa are no exception,
With the end of the civil war in Mozambique and the creation (or rehabilitation) of the
Maputo-Witbank corridor, southern Mozambique, a deficit maize area even in the best-
production years, faces a choice of importing maize either from South Africa or from
surplus maize areas in northern and central Mozambique. By far, the distance and the
quality of roads favor the route Maputo-South Africa.
Both formal and informal sectors are involved in maize trade between Maputo and South
Africa. The informal cross-border trade between the two countries has been flourishing
especially after economic reforms in Mozambique. In 1995/96, informal maize imports
from South Africa to Mozambique amounted to US$l.4 million (Macamo). Recorded
formal maize trade between Mozambique, South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe is
presented in appendix table 1.
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Table A.3. Recorded White Maize Imports and Exports between Mozambique
and Her Neighbors from 1994 to 1999 (US$/Year)
Importing Country
South Africa Malawi
Exporting Country
Year South Africa Zimbabwe
1994 515 117
1995 936 615
1996 1538 120
1997 1662
1998 4842 200
1999 2126 262
140
352
498
9523
5209
1035
Note: Author's compilation based on statistical bulletins from Ministerio do Plano e Financas and Instituto
Nacional de Estatistica.
Data collected in 1995/96 indicates that literate and formally unemployed males, living
predominantly on the Mozambique side ofthe border, dominate infonnal cross-border
trading. Using personal capital or informal credit schemes, these experienced informal
cross-border traders (ICBTs) get foreign currency in (iUegal) parallel exchange markets,
and use cash to buy goods that are transported in small quantities using heads, hand carts
or bicycles to avoid customs charges and reduce transport costs (Macamo).
Contrary to leBTs who do not pay taxes and operate in ambiguous legal status, formal
import traders must hold an import license, a certificate of commercial registry,
certification of paying taxes, and a certification from custom duties. Formal traders are
subject to inspections involving the Ministries of Commerce, Health and Labor and State
Administration (Coulter; Macamo). The cost to become fonnal traders are believed to be
one of the reasons for emergence of informal trading (Macamo; Jayne et al).
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The position of the GOM relative to maize imports has not been clearly understood.
Jayne et al. argue that the government does not play any role in maize imports other than
licensing. However, Maasdorp claims that Mozambique policy is to provide protection to
the maize and grain milling industries so that they can rebuild before they are opened for
free trade.
A question that has gone unanswered is how efficient spatial arbitrage between Maputo
and South Africa is? Using Baulch's switching regression outlined previously, this
chapter measures the efficiency of spatial arbitrage between Maputo and South Africa
maize markets. MontWy maize retail prices for Maputo are from SIMA database, and
spot prices from Randfontein (South Africa) are from SAFEX. Transport-cost data are
comprised by actual charges by the Transportes Lalgy, one of the local transport
companies operating in the route Maputo-South Africa. While the data from Transportes
Lalgy and SAFEX were provided in U.S. dollars, the data from SIMA were provided in
Meticais (MZM) per kilogram, and had to be converted to U.S.$ per kilogram using
exchange rate (MZMlUS$) provided by the Banco de Mocambique, the central bank. of
Mozambique. The conversion to US$ pennitted price comparability and some control for
inflation.
Transportation costs and price spreads between Maputo and Randfontein are plotted in
figure A.I. As figure A.I suggests, the difference between price spreads and
transportation costs has reduced over time but some arbitrage opportunities may have
gone unexploited. The PBM estimates indicate that arbitrage between Maputo and
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Randfontein is efficient 90 % of the time. Hence, the Maputo maize market has greater
probability of being integrated with South Africa than with maize markets within
Mozambique, except Chimoio.
While the efficiency of spatial arbitrage (90%) favors the claim that the GoM does not
play any role in maize imports other than licensing, there is some "room" for Maasdorp's
claim that the GoM maintains some controls over maize and grain imports to allow the
industry to develop before the borders are opened to free trade.
Figure A.t. Maize Transportation Cost, Price Spreads, and Trend Line from
Price Spreads (US$/Kilogram) between Maputo and Randfontein from 1998 to 2001
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